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Articles
FROTHY CHAOS: MODERN DATA
WAREHOUSING AND OLD-FASHIONED
DEFAMATION
Elizabeth D. De Armond*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every individual is unique. Each of us has a unique set of facts that
positively distinguishes us from everyone else in the world.1 Even
identical twins develop a different history, a different biography of
events, over the course of time. Among these events are our transactions
in commerce—the accounts we open, the items we buy, the bills we pay,
the services we obtain, the charges we make. All of these events can now
be, and often are, recorded digitally so that they can easily be duplicated,
searched, and transmitted to others. These advances in information
technology have not only benefited traditional entities that aggregate
personal information, such as credit reporting agencies, but new
aggregators who collect all sorts of information about individuals and
warehouse it in databases, and “data miners” who analyze and assemble
disparate bits of information about individuals to assemble profiles of
behavior.
In the midst of all this personal information churns a wealth of false
information, transactions linked to the wrong actor. Some of the
misattribution arises from identity theft, allowing impostors to pose as
their victims to gain goods and services. However, the detachment of
individuals from their data raises the real risk that one person’s deed
will be mismatched to another person’s identity, even when no thief has
sought to intentionally misdirect information. Our failure to take care to
match events with identities has led to a “frothy Chaos” of
misinformation and mismatched transactions.2 Furthermore, the power
of mismatched information, especially about financial transactions, to
disrupt or even paralyze, the lives of individuals has grown
dramatically. Important decisions are made based on rumor rather than
Assistant Professor of Law, Legal Research and Writing, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. I would like to thank Kristen Osenga and participants at a faculty workshop at
Chicago-Kent for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPOILED IDENTITY 57
(1963).
2
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, Of Glory, in ESSAYS 565 (John Florio trans., 1904).
*
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fact—defamation of a most damaging sort, damaging to reputation,
damaging to personality, and damaging to dignity.
Nonetheless, the power of law to curb the creation of these flawed
links has not kept up with information technology and its use. The main
legal scheme that regulates the aggregation and reporting of personal
financial information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), has failed
to maintain the integrity of that information, leading to too many
individuals suffering from a false reputation tainted by the acts of
others.3
However, the information age has not just given us the power to
record, store, and disseminate data; it allows us to use computers to
analyze, cross-check, and verify data more easily. These tools can
identify inaccurately-attributed information and keep it out of the data
sea. The age old tort of defamation, when viewed in light of these new
processes, can allow realistic relief that may motivate data aggregators to
treat individual records and personal identifying information much
more carefully.
In Shakespeare’s King Richard II, loyal Thomas Mowbray alludes to
the distinction between a “spotless reputation” and the body that it is
connected to.4 We may not all have spotless reputations, but we are at
least entitled to the reputation deserved by our own deeds rather than
the deeds of someone else. The answer to the problem of misinformation
about individuals lies not in retreating from technology, but in
embracing it.
This Article examines the particular problem of data inaccuracies
caused by or aggravated by information technology, the impact such
data can have on consumers, and the opportunity for the traditional tort
of defamation to redress that impact. Part II of this Article describes how
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000) [hereinafter FCRA].
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD II act 1, scene 1 (3d ed. 2000).
The full quotation is as follows:
The purest treasure mortal times afford
Is spotless reputation. That away,
Men are but gilded loam or painted clay.
A jewel in a ten-times-barred-up chest
Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast.
Mine honor is my life, both grow in one;
Take honor from me, and my life is done.
Then, dear my liege, mine honour let me try;
In that I live and for that will I die.
Id.

3
4
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individuals’ transactional identities develop through the aggregation of
individual events and identifies the entities that provide, collect, and
analyze those records. It then discusses the problem of false data,
especially false financial data, and explains how current information
practices have increased the power of such dirty data over the dignity
and personhood of individuals. Part III describes the FCRA, the existing
legal structure that should protect individuals from the impact of such
bad data, and how it has failed. Part IV identifies how the common law
tort of defamation can be brought up to date to appropriately balance the
rights and needs of individuals to bear an accurate reputation and the
power of data warehousers and miners over the vast databases they
tend.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. Biography and Image: The Construction of Our Transactional Identity
John Locke once described the identity of any one person as
consisting of “nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by
constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the
same organized Body.”5 Throughout our continued lives, we participate
in any number of events and transactions, performing all sorts of deeds.
Many of these are transactions where we exchange money or the
promise to pay money for goods and services or, in the case of charity,
for some higher return. For any one person, a full biography of these
transactions with others will distinguish that individual from every
other.6
Once, these transactions would have remained inseparable from the
parties who made them. In a local economy, a merchant would have
known his customers and a banker would have known his borrowers, by
name and by face. Reputations would have been built from these faceto-face transactions. Many transactions would have left no physical
record behind, but when Locke wrote these words in 1690 some might
have been memorialized on paper—a loan in a ledger, a sale on a receipt.
Although a particular individual would know of his own biography of
transactions, any third party could compile that list only by going from
store to store and bank to bank to painstakingly draw it up.

5
JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. 27, § 6, at
331-32 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690).
6
See GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 56 (describing the full set of facts known about someone
as a complex that positively identifies that individual).
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Because of the localized economy and in-person transactions, the
chances of ascribing a particular deed to the wrongdoer were likely
slight; should such an error have occurred, likely the consequences
would have been circumscribed to one event and the error easily undone
with a few strokes of a pen, at least so long as the one making the error
did not specifically seek to defame the customer.7 One’s reputation may
not have been wholly free from calumny and slander, but generally the
false words would have come from someone local, who was known, who
could be corrected or perhaps exposed.8 Because the transactions were
local, individuals had control over their reputations.
Now, however, instead of transacting with someone across a
counter, we transact with someone across the country, or even across
several continents.9 Transactions are much more likely to be electronic
and to be memorialized electronically, not just inscribed in a book.
Transactions that once would have required a consumer to physically
put pen to paper to sign off on an exchange can now be achieved
without pen or paper.10 We are far more likely now than a few decades
ago to borrow from or spend money with an entity that never sees us. In
fact, many details of a transaction might never fall in front of a pair of
human eyes. For example, a lender’s computer may automatically debit
a borrower’s bank account for the amount due monthly on a mortgage.
The funds may be subtracted from the borrower’s account and added to
the lender’s without any human intervention at all.11 Even when a
transaction does involve an interpersonal transaction, such as when a
department store clerk opens a charge card account for a customer at a
store counter, the details of the event will be recorded and stored in
electronic form and only incidentally on paper. The rise in this sort of
7
R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99, 100-03. The defamation
cases among the local cases in the English middle ages typically concerned personal insults.
Id.
8
See generally KENNETH GROSS, SHAKESPEARE’S NOISE (2001) (discussing themes of
slander, rumor, and gossip in Hamlet, Measure for Measure, King Lear, and Coriolanus).
Though written a bit earlier than Locke’s works, many of Shakespeare’s plays explored, as
part of the study of the characters, their reaction to slander from familiar sources. Id.
9
Cf. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000).
10
See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70017021 (2000); The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 7 (draft 1999), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecicta/eta1299.htm. Such electronic signatures can
authenticate a transaction much as a written one can. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
supra.
11
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2000). Such a transaction is
called a “preauthorized electronic fund transfer” and is generally governed by the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act. Id.
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electronic, detached commerce has led to a variety of federal laws to
regulate it, including the Electronic Funds Transfer Act,12 the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,13 and the Check
Clearing for the 21st Century Act.14
This change in the form of commerce has correspondingly changed
the construction of each person’s transactional identity, the image from
which an individual’s reputation flows. Through one’s actions, one
relates to others and makes impressions on them. These impressions,
taken as a whole, constitute an individual’s reputation—that is, what
other people think of you, to the extent that their thoughts arise from
what they know about you, or think they know about you.15 As Steven
Heyman writes, “While reputation belongs to the self, in another sense it
is external to the self, existing within the minds of others.”16 Thus, our
reputation for worthiness to participate in transactions depends on our
transactions, the image that those transactions portray, and how others
view that image.
The biography of our transactions is not fixed; it changes with each
transaction, each transaction augmenting a person’s history, adding to it
like a flake of snow onto a snowball, compiling what Erving Goffman
referred to as “a single continuous record of social facts” that stick to our
identity.17 A single day in a typical modern consumer’s life could yield
the information that such a consumer bought a cup of coffee and a
newspaper, ate lunch out, purchased two books that were on the New
York Times bestseller list, refilled a prescription, paid a gas bill, all added
to the data sea. Each day, more and more such transactions will stick to

Id. §§ 1693-1693r.
15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7021 (2000).
14
12 U.S.C. § 5001 (Supp. III 2003) (allowing banks to substitute an electronic image of a
check for the paper item through the electronic process). See generally BENJAMIN GEVA, THE
LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS (2002).
15
See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2556
(1993) (listing as one definition of “reputation”: “[t]he general opinion or estimate of a
person’s character, behaviour, etc.; the relative esteem in which a person or thing is held”);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal
History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2002).
16
Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1325 (1998). “In this way, [according to
Heyman,] reputation resembles the right to property, which is also external to the
individual.” Id.; see also Montaigne, supra note 2, at 560 (“There is both name, and the
thing: the name, is a voice which noteth, and signifieth the thing: the name, is neither part
of thing nor of substance: it is a stranger-piece joyned to the thing, and from it.”).
17
GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 57.
12
13
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that individual’s identity and adjust the existing image that the
biography portrays.
In pointed contrast, our identifying markers are relatively fixed.
Some types of identifying information—one’s date of birth, place of
birth, and mother’s maiden name, for example—never change.18 Social
security numbers and gender have similar staying power for the vast
majority of us.19 Other forms of identifying information, such as address
and telephone number, may change from time to time, more for some
than for others, but generally remain stable for at least some period.
When a financial event becomes recorded electronically, markers
that purport to identify a flesh and blood individual are recorded with it.
This identifying information in an electronic record can be thought of as
“header” information.20 Biographies can be formed by amassing the
scattered and strewn records that have matching header information.
So, for example, a restaurant may record the items a customer ordered
and the amount paid (including tip), tag it with header information
consisting of the customer’s name, and charge the account number. The
record can then be pooled with other transactions bearing those markers.
Similarly, a pharmacist can record the medicine, dosage, and prescribing
doctor of a prescription and pair it with the customer’s name, date-ofbirth, and insurance information.
All of the records that bear the identity tags of a specific individual
give rise to a transactional identity, what Daniel Solove calls a “digital
dossier.”21 The collection of transactional identities creates a parallel
universe of sorts, one inhabited by virtual individuals who comprise not
Locke’s “fleeting Particles of Matter,” but rather permanent particles of
data. This virtual person portrays its own digital reputation.22 From the
18
Concededly, one may be mistaken about such information, and new information may
then change the marker.
19
See The Official Website of the U.S. Social Security Administration, www.ssa.gov (last
visited Jan. 13, 2007). The Social Security Administration will issue a new social security
number only under very limited circumstances. Id.
20
See Individual Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 17 (D.D.C.
2001) (describing “‘credit header’” information as “the name, address, social security
number, and telephone number of a consumer”).
21
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 1 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON].
22
Cf. Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165, 1170-72 (2001) (arguing that
“imaginary virtual humans,” digital clones of living individuals, are entitled to protection
from defamation, invasion of privacy, and commercial misassociation with products and
services).
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perspective of those who observe any one virtual person, whether to
evaluate the person as a credit risk, an insurance or employment
prospect, or someone with money to spend, the person may be no more
than the particular fragments of information that interest them. The self
is presented not as a unified whole, but as facets of database records.23
B. The Impact of Data Technology
Records of information about individuals and their transactions are
not new. We have been able to track transactions since the agrarian
society of the Sumerians developed Cuneiform,24 and used it for, among
other purposes, memorializing debts for barley on wet clay tablets.25 The
aggregation of transactional records is not a modern development either.
Comprehensive records began to be kept to serve the needs of evolving
societies in the beginning of the last millennium. For example, William
the Conqueror commissioned the Domesday Book in 1086 to identify the
ownership of all land, buildings, livestock, and other resources for the
purpose of assessing taxes.26
But since those times, we have developed far more useful systems
for recording individuals’ transactions. A clay tablet is not duplicated
easily, is somewhat cumbersome to carry around, and would likely be
viewed by only a few people—perhaps only the original parties to the
exchange. These factors constrained the power of the information on the
tablet. Even access to the Domesday Book would have been limited to
those with the position to gain an audience with it.

Cf. Richard Warner, Surveillance & the Self: Privacy, Identity, and Technology, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 847, 854-55 (2005) (describing how one’s identity encompasses different social roles
for different purposes).
24
STEVEN ROGER FISHER, A HISTORY OF WRITING 26-27 (2004).
25
Science Museum of Minnesota, http://www.smm.org/research/Anthropology/
cuneiform/cuneiform.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (museum cuneiform collection
containing such tablets). Later, another agrarian society, the Incas, used knot records to
record mercantile transactions. FISHER, supra note 24, at 14. The record system was known
as quipu and continued after the Spanish conquest. Id. at 15. The system counted potatoes,
sheep, and grains. Id.
26
See SIR HENRY ELLIS, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO DOMESDAY BOOK: OFFICIAL COPY FOR
THE USE OF HIS MAJESTY’S COMMISSIONERS ON THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE KINGDOM 177
(1817). The new idea of compiled, permanent records led twelfth-century Christians to call
the work the “Domesday Book,” comparing it to the Last Judgment, or Doomsday,
described in the Bible, when the deeds of Christians written in the Book of Life were to be
placed before God for judgment. See Revelations 20:12, 20:15.
23
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The Accessibility and Power of Data

As more of our deeds are inscribed in bytes rather than on paper,
more information about us is more available and accessible than ever
before. Information about individuals, from their debts to their DNA,
can now be stored digitally, allowing others to duplicate, download,
upload, e-mail, search, and even print the information—albeit far more
likely onto paper than onto clay. Others can also compare and contrast
information quickly and easily with other information and, with just a
few key strokes, search the data for any string of characters.
As discussed above, all of this information about any one
individual’s transactions becomes a financial “digital dossier” that has
replaced a locally made and personally observed reputation.27 Now, our
reputations are perceived by many observers almost entirely from bits of
data over which we have practically no control. Creditors, landlords,
utility companies, mortgagees, and even employers may condition
services on the basis of information in an individual’s credit report—the
commercially available representation of a reputation—and can use that
information to change the terms of a deal, or even to refuse to participate
at all. A data entry thousands of miles away, created from a transaction
that never involved a face, may be the single most significant piece of
information to a potential creditor, employer, or government official.
It is not just the records of private sector entities, such as banks,
businesses, and doctors, that have become digitized; public records are
far more accessible as well. Once, to comprehensively learn someone’s
criminal history a researcher would have had to go to each courthouse in
each jurisdiction where the target may have been and research through
the public records. The information may have been public, but the pains
required to search through it rendered much of it functionally invisible.
However, more and more public entities record information
electronically and make it available. For example, many states post
online lists of sexual predators pursuant to “Megan’s laws.”28 Similarly,
many public records formerly buried in clerk’s offices are now available
via the Internet, removing the effort barrier and revealing what once
would have been, for practical purposes, hidden from most.29

SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1.
See Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws,
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2005) (listing the sex offender registry laws of all fifty states).
29
See, e.g., Cook County Recorder of Deeds, http://www.ccrd.info/CCRD/il031/
index.jsp (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (property records of Cook County, Illinois). For
27
28
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Public or private, much information about individuals is but
keystrokes away from appearing on any computer screen in the world.
Accordingly, information about an individual can be viewed by more
people and more easily than can the account books of the last century.30
Our reputations have become, as Steven Nock terms, “portable.”31 That
portability has changed the power of the information.
Data in electronic form is not just much more accessible, it is also
much more easily duplicated. One need not laboriously copy, character
by character, information onto a new clay tablet, need not transcribe it,
key by key, onto a separate sheet of paper, and need not even spin the
drum of a mimeograph machine. Rather, now we can hit “control-c” and
“control-v” or click “save as,” and store a fresh and complete copy of the
information in our own files. We can then upload that file to the
Internet, making it available for one, dozens, hundreds, thousands, to
likewise copy and save. Although photocopy machines also eased
duplication, digital duplication allows us to send the information out in
an e-mail to any number of others. Information that once was tied down,
by simple physicality, to a point certain in space, can now live in a near
infinite number of places.
Not only is digital information on the Internet far easier to access
and duplicate than print information (or clay tablets), that access and
duplicatability give it more stamina than its print cousin. Pieces of paper
yellow, curl, and eventually disintegrate, and, unless catalogued with
librarian-like precision, are highly likely to get lost or buried before
reaching such ends. But even if many hard drives suddenly fail, an item
of electronic information may well have been sufficiently copied to allow
the substance to survive somewhere. Even data that a user tries to
destroy often remains available to a savvy searcher.
Digital information’s searchability also increases its power. Because
the information resides in bytes, it sifts easily through a custom-made
strainer constructed with “control-f” or a similar tool. In contrast, no
control-f exists to help us find things in real space. Without the ability to
have a computer search for that piece of information, the chances of
recalling the data are far lower. Just as keeping records in the musty files
example, many taxing authorities have put property records online that list, for each parcel,
that parcel’s owner, the assessed value, and any interests that burden the property, such as
mortgages, liens, and deeds. Id.
30
See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
31
STEVEN L. NOCK, COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN AMERICA 3
(1993).
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of a courthouse archive room renders most of the data held within
functionally invisible, material in homes, businesses, and other locales,
even if exactingly indexed, will lose accessibility and with that, its power
to impact future transactions.
Not only can a human easily search digitized data, but so can
machines, far more quickly and thoroughly. Once programmed with a
particular algorithm, a powerful computer can examine in seconds what
once would have taken legions of clerks to page through. Many
consumers do not realize that when they apply for credit, no one at the
creditor’s office may ever read the consumer’s credit history. Rather, a
computer will pull and examine a credit score, a number produced from
that credit history through some sort of algorithm that assigns different
weights to different types of data.32 Thus, the information’s power can
be disconnected from the data itself, transformed via machine and
algorithm into a three-digit representation of a person.
The effects of electronic storage of records and advances in database
technology extend beyond increased access to and searchability of the
information. The uniformity of the medium has increased the power of
information because digitizing it pancakes time. Information from ten
years ago might well appear just as fresh as information from yesterday.
The associated aspects of aged information that might have cued us to
draw less significance from it—the yellowing newspaper, the faded
print, the curled and frayed edges of a long-stored document, the noir
appearance of a microfiche—impacted our perception of the value of the
information contained within it, and may well have led us to attribute
less significance to the contents than we once would. However, these
associated aspects have, in many cases, been stripped away from the
content. Now, aged information may well present itself on our computer
screen as being no older than, no less reliable than, no less interesting
than, information dated today. We have to rely on the associated date,
not other cues, to note its freshness. Thus, older information has more
vigor than it once might have; therefore, we react to it differently and we
give it more credence than we might have in the past. In this way, an
electronic description of a past deed can have a much longer half-life
than a physical record of the same event.
Additional power arises from the tremendous interest that
information of the events in our lives has for those with whom we do, or
would like to do, business, and for those who would like to do business
32

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/6

See infra text accompanying notes 37-59.

De Armond: Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamati

2007]

Modern Data Warehousing and Defamation

1071

with us. In the first category are those who seek to establish our merit
for a specific transaction or relationship, for example, to provide us
insurance, to employ us, or to extend us credit.33 In the second are those
who seek to identify us to target us for a sales pitch—direct marketers
and politicians, for instance.34 Both types assess an individual’s
information to determine that individual’s worthiness—that is, that
individual’s reputation—generated from the individual data items. The
appetite of these actors for our transactional information, the biography
of those facts deemed relevant by others and that distinguishes us from
other consumers, has grown with the ability to store those facts
electronically.35
In light of their accessibility and vigor, these “digital dossiers” raise
privacy concerns, even when they faithfully represent the deeds of the
individual to which they are linked, because they impair our control
over the image that we project to the world. In this conception of
privacy, we have a right to a certain amount of control over the image,
the face, we present to the world.36 However, the point of this Article is
not to address that duplication and distribution, the ease of access to
information, as it impacts the sense of our vulnerability to true
information. Rather, this Article argues that those attributions of
information all magnify the importance of truth, and that importance
justifies protecting individuals from bearing the burden of digital
reputations poisoned by dirty data.
The rate of errors and
misinformation in these dossiers may be so pervasive that any single one
may in fact project a fictional, “virtual” person, consisting in part of data
mis-hung on the identity of the flesh and blood individual, bearing
perhaps only a surface resemblance to that person. Nonetheless, no
matter how poorly the universe of virtual individuals may mirror the
universe of flesh and blood individuals, the world may well treat a
virtual individual as more real than the flesh and blood counterpart.

33
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000) (providing the general definition of “consumer
report” for purposes of the FCRA).
34
See Chris Cilliza and Jim VandeHei, In Ohio, a Battle of Databases, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2006, at A01 (discussing Republicans’ use of information about voters to “microtarget”
them for particular campaign material).
35
See infra text accompanying notes 37-59.
36
Among those who perceive privacy this way are Alan F. Westin and Thomas Nagel.
THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 4 (2002); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY &
FREEDOM 34 (1967).
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The Big Business of Warehousing, Aggregating, and Analyzing Data

In contrast to the private-sector entities that find, analyze, and
aggregate such data, individuals have very little control over their
personal data.37 The growth in the power of electronic information has
sprouted entities, data aggregators, and data miners, who seek to collect
the records from disparate sources, reassemble them into a digital report,
and analyze them to gain a picture of that person, the image from which
observers draw our transactional reputations.38
These modern entities have their roots in the last century. The first
credit bureaus began to be organized in the late 1800s by merchants who
needed to know who would repay loans and who might not.39 Since
then, however, database architecture and power have increased to allow
any minute information about any commercial transaction to be
recorded, compared, reassembled, and analyzed.40 An individual’s
transaction history comprises all sorts of information about that
individual’s practices. Accounts, past and present, payments made,
delayed, or missed altogether, lawsuits pending, rental history, account
balances and available credit, and employment history can all be part of
a credit report.41 Unpaid parking tickets and library fines can also be

37
See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1259-60 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Enforcing Privacy Rights] (arguing
that putting identity theft prevention on the shoulders of individuals puts the burden on
the wrong parties; the security is only as good as the entities choose).
38
See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 126-28 (2000) (describing the aggregated
information about consumer transactions as “gossip”).
39
EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & CREDIT REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM REALLY
WORKS, WHAT YOU CAN DO 177 (2d ed. 2005).
40
Elisa Williams, The Man Who Knows Too Much, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2002, at 68. The Fair
Isaac Corporation, for example, offers algorithms that help retailers match purchasers to
other information, such as the place the purchaser lives, the car the purchaser drives, and
the living the purchaser earns. Id.
41
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000). The FCRA defines a consumer report as follows:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used
or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for—
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this
title.
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collected.42 Experian, one of the three major consumer credit reporting
agencies, advertises that it maintains more than 65 terabytes—that is, 65
trillion bytes—of data on North American consumers and businesses,43
including details on 215 million American consumers.44 Each of the big
three credit reporting agencies receives more than 2 billion transaction
records each month.45
But while traditional credit reporting agencies have generally kept
track of consumer accounts and bill-paying practices, the modern
consumer data industry has started to track far more mundane
information about a person’s transactions. Advances in information
technology have led to an industry of “data mining,” by which a miner
sifts through personal information to find patterns by which to predict
future behavior.46 This industry overlaps the traditional credit reporting
industry, but may collect many more types of data far beyond those
arising from routine financial transactions. One example of such entities
is ChoicePoint, which advertises that its database maintains information
on more than 210 million individuals, from “demographic data, credit
data, property and auto insurance projected renewal dates, and other
insurance and financial attributes, all linked together for immediate and
targeted deployment . . . .”47 ChoicePoint offers its clients a wealth of
data services, ranging from pre-employment checks and public record
searches to insurance claim analyses and identity verification services.48
Where do these entities get these records?
Well, we shed
aggregatable data at every turn. We buy groceries with loyalty cards

Id. The definition continues to exclude certain reports from the general definition. Id.
§ 1681a(d)(2).
42
Surprising Things Can Wreck Your Credit Score: Unpaid Parking Tickets, Overdue Library
Books, Might Affect Credit (Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.nbc10.com/consumeralert/
4883326/detail.html.
43
Experian, http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last visited Jan. 13,
2007).
44
Id.
45
Robert Avery, Paul Calem, Glenn Canner, & Raphael Bostic, An Overview of Consumer
Data and Credit Reporting, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2003, at 49.
46
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, No. GAO-04-548, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a
Wide Range of Uses 4 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf
(defining “data mining as the application of database technology and techniques–such as
statistical analysis and modeling–to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in
data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results”).
47
ChoicePoint, Precision Marketing, http://www.cp-pm.com/media/pdf/CPDL%20
Brochure%20-%20Oct2005.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
48
ChoicePoint,
Industry
Solutions,
http://www.choicepoint.com/industry/all_
products.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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and information-ravenous merchants and marketers scoop up the
records.49 These loyalty cards can yield millions of transactions each
week.50 Every item bought can be tracked.51 But the products we buy
are not the only grist we provide to the information mill. Aggregators
are also interested in the services individuals use, some of which can
yield uncomfortably sensitive information as well. For example, they
may want to collect the details of our cell phone calls, including the
numbers dialed and the time connected.52 The Medical Information
Bureau, an association of insurance companies, allows its members to
exchange medical information about individuals for, among other
purposes, “risk management.”53
So how does all this occur? A business may create an electronic
record of a sale, loan, payment, or other event. Businesses warehouse
their own data for their own purposes. Stores may keep track of
purchases to understand consumer preference, to track consumer
returns, or to predict consumer behavior. For example, Amazon uses
existing purchase information to make suggestions to customers.54 WalMart uses point-of-sale transaction information and warehouses it to
identify merchandising opportunities and to manage store inventory.55
Financial institutions that participate in the Automated Clearinghouse
keep records of the electronic payments that consumers make to buy all
these goods and services.56 Any of these businesses may then provide
their records of transactions to a data aggregator.

49
Grocery Store Loyalty Card Use Is Strong Despite Privacy Concerns, http://inewswire.com/pr1371.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). One study of 515 adults by Boston
University’s School of Communications found that 86% of adults have at least one grocery
store card, and three-quarters of them use a card nearly every time they shop. Id.
50
See, e.g., Catalina Marketing, http://www.catalinamarketing.com/our_advantage/
index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). For example, Catalina Marketing claims it logs over a
quarter of 1 billion transactions per week from 21,000 supermarkets, tracking the buying
behavior of over 100 million households. Id.
51
See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1.
52
Frank Main, Your Phone Records Are for Sale, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006.
53
Medical Information Bureau, http://www.mib.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). This
Boston-based company provides information to about 600 life insurance companies, many
of which offer other types of insurance for which individuals’ histories impact risk, such as
health or disability insurance. Id. Member companies report medical information to the
MIB to be shared with other members. Id.
54
Amazon,
www.amazon.com/gp/yourstore/ref+sv_1/002-8216248-8062414
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2007).
55
Walmart, http://www.walmartfacts.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
56
NACHA, http://www.nacha.org/About/default.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
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With this information, an aggregator’s subscriber can decide
whether it wants to extend credit to that same individual. Or perhaps
the individual already has an account with the subscriber; the subscriber
may be seeking an opportunity to raise the rate of an individual
cardholder, and can only do so by learning that the same individual has
paid another account late.57 The data created and collected by businesses
has significant value to those who would like to identify future
customers and political candidates who would like to identify support.58
Even, and perhaps more disturbingly, governmental agencies have
sought access to Americans’ transactional biographies.59
As a result, a major problem arises when the transactions are
mismatched and individuals’ images projected from all this digital data
distort, leading to a virtual person whose reputation will be tied to the
individual despite the mismatch.
C. The Polluted Information Sea
Individuals transact, businesses record those transactions, and
aggregators collect those records, connecting the transactions and their
details to the individuals to create digital biographies that they and
others can mine. However, careless use of information technology has
led to aggregators ascribing significant events to the wrong persons. A
certain amount of information attributed to any one individual may be
false. As businesses, governmental units, and others store more data and
increase access to that data, they will also store more inaccurate data and
increase the risk that others, including data warehousers, will have
access to it and further publish and disseminate it. At the speed of light,
the misinformation can spread to a wealth of interested watchers.
Empirical evidence indicates that mismatching leads to inaccurate
biographies alarmingly often, whether through undermatching or fuzzy
matching. According to the Federal Reserve Board, many consumer
See Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card Woes for Millions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004. Such a provision is called a “universal default clause,” and imposes a
penalty rate when a consumer pays late to another creditor. Id.
58
See Kintera, http://www.kinterainc.com/site/C.OWL8JO07KZE/b.1485573/k.BE48/
Home.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). For example, Kintera, a software application service
provider that supports non-profit organizations, advertises a software product called the
Kintera Sphere that can be used by campaigns, fundraising organizations, and other
groups to identify potential donors.
59
Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial
Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 595, 598, 611 (2004).
57
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credit files contain incomplete or ambiguous information.60 One study
found that almost half of consumer reporting complaints to the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) involved mismerged files. In nearly twothirds of those complaints, the consumer’s information had been mixed
with that of total strangers; in the remainder, the mismatched
information belonged to relatives or former spouses.61 Another study
found that nearly 80% of the reports examined contained mistakes of
some kind, and a full quarter of the reports contained errors sufficiently
serious to cause credit to be denied.62 Individuals who have purchased
their own reports from ChoicePoint, a major data aggregator, have found
errors of attribution ranging in import from the relatively minor, such as
ownership of autos never owned, to major, such as the individual’s own
death.63
Information attributed to any one particular individual can be false
in different ways. The type of falsity addressed here arises when a
particular event may in fact have occurred, but the event is treated as the
deed not of the originating individual—for example, the person who in
fact bought an item, took out a loan, missed a payment—but rather of
someone else. Misidentifications that hurt the target’s reputation
defame. While such misidentifications occurred before the modern
information age, the rise of electronic records and their use by the
consumer data industry has magnified the impact of this problem.64
Avery et al., supra note 45, at 70-71.
U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, CREDIT BUREAUS: PUBLIC ENEMY #1 AT THE FTC
(Oct. 1993) (on file with author) (analyzing 140 complaints to the FTC). The Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, required the FTC to report to Congress about the
problems of mismerged files. Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 318 (Dec. 4, 2003). The report made a
surface evaluation of the costs and benefits of requiring the three largest consumer
reporting agencies, Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax, to match more points of
identification, and concluded that requiring more matching would reduce mismerged files,
and noted that mismerged files “are costly for consumers,” but nonetheless emphasized
that stricter matching might lead to incomplete files which would decrease their value for
users. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 319 OF
THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf. The agency did not explain why
mismerged files do not similarly impact uncertainty. Id.
62
ALISON CASSIDY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS
IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 11, 13 (June 2004), available at http://www.uspirg.org/
uploads/BE/ev/BEevuv19a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf [hereinafter
MISTAKES DO HAPPEN].
63
Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled with Errors (Mar. 8, 2005), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/7118767/.
64
See, e.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1973) (misidentifying
plaintiff as defendant in two lawsuits when in fact those suits were filed against another
individual with the same first and last name).
60
61
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Some errors occur because the identifying information of the actor is
mistranscribed, others because otherwise accurate information is
mismatched to the wrong person.
1.

Misattribution by Mistranscription

Misattribution may arise when a direct party to a transaction
mistranscribes the individual’s identifying information.65 That is, where
a party memorializes some sort of financial event, the person or device
recording it may fail to assign the event to the identity of its doer, but
rather may attach it to the identity of someone else, or even of no one at
all. Such misidentification is routinely a matter of human error. A clerk,
for example, may mistype a social security number.66 One jobseeker lost
many employment opportunities, learning too late that a sheriff office
employee mistyped the social security number of a criminal, substituting
the jobseeker’s social security number.67 Alternatively, a machine may
malfunction. A fictional, and highly visual, variation of this arises in the
film Brazil, where a fly falls into a government office’s printer, causing
the machine to type a “B” in place of a “T” in the name of a man sought
by officials. The shift of that one letter sends a swat team to storm into
the house of the wrong man as he slept, arresting him in front of his
horrified family, and dragging him away. In a real life example, a
consumer sued two consumer reporting agencies after they reported that
he was a judgment debtor in an amount of nearly half a million dollars.68
A county clerk had erroneously recorded the judgment in the docket
book; in fact, the consumer was the plaintiff in the action, the judgment
creditor, not the defendant; the result was a swing of nearly a million
dollars in the plaintiff’s favor.69 However, even though the clerk
corrected the information, the two agencies did not pick up the
correction and accordingly misattributed the debt to the consumer in a
report issued more than six months later.70

See infra notes 66-72.
Christopher Conkey, US Gives Some Fraud Victims New Social Security Numbers (July 6,
2005), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05187/533663.stm (describing case of
jobseeker who learned too late that a sheriff’s clerk had mistyped his social security
number as the number of a convicted criminal).
67
Id.
68
Frost v. Experian, No. 98-CIV-2106-JGK-JCP, 1999 WL 287373 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1999).
69
Id. at *7.
70
Id. The court refused the agencies’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim that the defendants acted willfully, justifying punitive damages under the FCRA. Id.
at 8; see also Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1994) (where clerk
65
66
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In an infamous instance of misattribution by mistranscription, the
consumer reporting agency TRW, Experian’s predecessor, contracted
with an outside company to review a Vermont town’s public records to
find those consumers who had defaulted on their property taxes.71 The
researcher copied information from the wrong rolls, and as a result, all
compliant property owners in the town were reported as delinquent in
paying their property taxes.72
In contrast to these ordinary misattributions, sometimes
misidentified information arises when a third party, an identity thief,
intentionally misdirects the recorder into mistranscribing the victim’s
identifying information as the thief’s, pinning the wrong identity to the
act. This crime has received marquee attention of late:73 with the rise of
instant credit, electronic transactions, and easy access to personal
identification keys such as social security numbers and account numbers,
identity theft has soared.74 Both federal and state laws now specifically
criminalize it.75 But identity theft is not new—impostors have likely
been with us since sufficient people inhabited the earth to support it.76
Nonetheless, the crime is much easier now that disconnected
transactions have supplanted so many face-to-face ones.
In a typical identity theft case, the thief uses a consumer’s identifying
information to create new accounts with merchants, creditors, and other
mistakenly recorded a judgment in a suit brought against two brothers in both their names
when judgment was in fact against only one).
71
Sharon Kindel, Garbage In: Credit Bureaus Have Terrible Error Rates, FIN. WORLD, Sept.
29, 1992, at 61.
72
Id.
73
Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top102005.htm (last
visited Jan. 13, 2007). For example, identity theft has been the subject of the most
complaints to the FTC every year since 2000. Id. The FTC has developed a sizable set of
web materials. See Federal Trade Commission, Fighting Back Against Identity Theft,
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
74
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES AND
TRENDS, JANUARY 1-DECEMBER 31, 2005, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/pdf/clearing
house_2005.pdf. Identity theft accounted for more than 255,000 complaints to the FTC’s
fraud and identity theft complaint database, Consumer Sentinel, in 2005. Id. The
complaints had increased by about 9000 from 2004. Id.
75
See, e.g., The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 928(b)(1),
1028 (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 530.5-530.8 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.77-190.84
(McKinney 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51 (Vernon 2003).
76
HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY bk. 3, at 61 (David Grene trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1987).
As just one example, in ancient Persia, a Magian impostor adopted the identity of Smerdis,
King of Persia (and the second son of Cyrus the Great), after Smerdis was assassinated. Id.
The false Smerdis was overthrown and slain in 521 B.C., after reigning for seven months.
Id. at 79.
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third parties, then uses those accounts to acquire goods and services for
which the thief will not pay.77 The misattribution arises when the
business entity ties the transaction to the victim’s identity markers
instead of the thief’s. After failing to obtain the correct identifying
information, the entity assigns the transaction to the wrong person.
Eventually, the recording entity will report the transaction to a data
aggregator, such as a consumer reporting agency, as being the victim’s
work, rather than the thief’s.
Public records become polluted by mistranscription as well. For
example, an identity thief may commit a crime in the name of another
and, upon arrest, give the arresting officer the identifying information of
the victim. The jurisdiction of the arrest will dutifully record that
information in a computer—thus further victimizing the original
victim—and treat it as if the information were verified. If we assume
that the thief in fact committed the underlying crime, the falseness in the
new information lies not in the fact of the event having occurred—the
assault, the burglary, the drug use—but in the identity of the actor in the
event. Someone committed the act, but not the person the database now
records as having done so.
Civil public records have also become tainted. Although less serious
than a wrongful conviction, identity thefts in bankruptcy courts have
been rising, leading some individuals to have to fight to have a
bankruptcy they never filed removed from their name.78 In this case, it is
the court clerk who misattributes the events to the victim, having failed
to verify the filer’s identity.
From one standpoint, the cause of this misattribution is the thief’s
use of the identifying information of another. However, from another,
the cause of this misattribution is the failure of the recorder, business, or
public entity to do as much as it could to verify the identity of those with
whom they deal. The significant damage that thieves do to individuals
arises not from the work of the impostor, but from the responses of
others. It is not the thief who records the account, the creditor does that.
It is not the thief who reports the new debt in the victim’s name, the
creditor does that as well, and the aggregator, not the thief, falsely
77
See Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, supra note 73; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
Coping with Identity Theft: Reducing the Risk of Fraud, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/
fs17-it.htm#crime (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (This sort of identity theft is also known as
“‘true name fraud.’”).
78
Peter C. Alexander, Identity Theft & Bankruptcy Expungement, 77 AM. BANKER L.J. 409,
411-12 (2003).
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reports to others that the debt is the victim’s, rather than the thief’s. In
this way, the damage done to a reputation by identity theft differs little
from that caused by non-criminal carelessness. For purposes of record
matching, the intent of the actor matters less than the actions of the
person or entity that tags the thief’s acts with the victim’s identity
markers. The injury suffered by identity theft victims would not arise
without the participation of the third parties in the data market.
Thus, although motivations behind mistranscription errors vary, the
common underlying element is the creation of a record that describes an
event that actually occurred, but ascribes it to the wrong person. The
event then pollutes the transactional biography of the misidentified doer,
corrupting the image that the biography portrays to the world, and thus
deflating (if negative) the degree of esteem the doer has earned.
2.

Misattribution by Mismatching

Mistranscription is one form of mismatching but a more pervasive
problem of misattribution arises where the identity information of a
particular record of an event is mismatched to the identity of someone
with superficially similar identifying information. The three major
consumer data aggregators, Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax (also
known as consumer reporting agencies), do not simply add each new
record to a consumer’s file the way, for instance, a lawyer would keep a
file for a client and add to it letters from that client, pleadings from the
client’s case, and such.79 Rather, data providers, such as merchants and
creditors, send records to the agencies with the identity markers of the
individual to whom the provider attributes the event, such as name, date
of birth, and social security number, and the agencies store the records in
their databases.80 When an agency’s subscriber seeks a report about a
particular individual, the subscriber supplies identifying markers (or
pegs, in Goffman’s terms) and, applying this identifying information, the
agency’s computer runs an algorithm that searches the databases for
records with matching, or similar, identifying information.81 Thus, the
file is pulled together dynamically at that moment for the immediate
purpose.82 The matching algorithm, rather than the record’s location,
HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 144.
Id.; see also Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004).
81
HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 144; see also Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972 (describing process);
Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M. 2006) (same);
McKeown v. Sears Roebuck Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930-31 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (same).
82
See Apodaca, 417 F. Supp. at 1224 (describing process); McKeown, 335 F. Supp. 2d at
930-31 (describing process).
79
80

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/6

De Armond: Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned Defamati

2007]

Modern Data Warehousing and Defamation

1081

determines whether the record of a particular event will be assigned to
the specific individual or not.83 The algorithm determines both the
identity markers that it will examine and the degree of fuzziness it will
tolerate in matching those markers. For example, the algorithm of one
major agency, Experian, uses thirteen matching elements, including not
just a full social security number, but also a mere fragment.84
Misattribution by mismatching may arise through undermatching or
fuzzy matching.
a.

Undermatching

Undermatching can arise when the identifying information attached
to a particular event is insufficiently complete to avoid ambiguity.85 For
example, an event may be identified by only a person’s name. As an
example of this sort of misattribution, a doctor’s office clerk may put the
test results of one James Jones into the file, whether paper or electronic,
of another James Jones. Although other markers of the two individuals’
identities, such as middle name, date of birth, place of birth, and
telephone number, may be different, the data is “undermatched”—
limited to the first and last names when more identifying information is
necessary to match the record to a single individual.
In the doctor’s office example, the creator of the record misidentifies
the actor if she selects the wrong James Jones. However, misattribution
by undermatching also arises when the record is collected by a data
aggregator that then uses the imprecise identifying information to
misattribute the act to another. This sort of misattribution, also known
as mismerging, is often to blame for bad transactional biographies.86 In
mismerging, a data aggregator incorrectly identifies a particular event as
being the responsibility of the targeted individual. In contrast to
misattribution by mistranscription, where the error arises at the initial
recording of the data, misattribution by mismatching arises when a party
tries to match a particular record to the identity of someone already
HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 145-47.
Id. at 146. The agency’s algorithm also uses the following elements: last name; first
name; middle name; suffix; age; gender; street number; street name; apartment number;
city, state, and zip code; and trade account number. Id.
85
This concept is also sometimes referred to as “partial matching.” See, e.g., Apodaca, 417
F. Supp. at 1224 (describing logic); HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 148-51.
86
CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AM. AND NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT SCORE
ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 35 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/121702CFA_NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf
[hereinafter CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY]. Nicknames, misspellings, transposed social
security numbers, and mismatching all contribute to merging errors. Id.
83
84
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known. The mismatching arises when a data aggregator chooses to
undermatch the record to an individual on the basis of some identity
markers.
As an example of incomplete identifying information, a record may
identify a transaction as belonging to a John Q. Public, and in fact the
aggregator has records belonging to more than one—perhaps several—
John Q. Publics lurking within the depths of its databases. The
aggregator may assign the record to all of them when it goes fishing for a
specific John Q. Public’s file, which is not a problem, necessarily, if it
ends up on the record of the John Q. Public who incurred the transaction,
but potentially quite a problem if it ends up on the record of a John Q.
Public who did not. For example, in Apodaca v. Discover Financial
Services,87 a consumer named Victoria Apodaca spent nearly a year
trying to disconnect the bankruptcy and debts of another woman,
Victoria Lopez Apodaca, from her credit report.88 The aggregator does
not intend to tie the fact of the event to the wrong individual, the wrong
construction of Locke’s “organized Body,” but it does so anyway because
it did not sufficiently identify the person on whose identity peg the event
should be hung. Such a mistake may be the result of an identity thief
seeking to intentionally mislead a creditor or a consumer reporting
agency into misreporting a transaction as having been incurred by the
robbed. Such a thief may have some, but not all, of the usual identity
markers of the victim.
Data aggregators are motivated to match each transaction that comes
in to a particular consumer. These transactions only have value to the
aggregators’ subscribers who purchase the information if they are
attributed to a particular individual. Data aggregators’ customers do not
subscribe to them to find out if a particular event occurred—that is, to
find out whether someone, anyone, owes $5,000 to Sears, $3,000 of which
comprises late fees and accumulated interest. No, what subscribers to
the credit reporting agencies and other data aggregators want to know is
who bought what, who incurred that debt, who is responsible for repaying
it. The information of the transaction alone is not what makes the
information valuable. It is the matching of the transactions with the
individual—the connecting piece—that makes the information valuable.
This motivation can raise the risk of mistattribution.

417 F. Supp. 2d 1220.
Id. at 1222-25. Seven of nine digits in the two women’s social security numbers
matched, but they lived in different towns and shared no other identifying markers. Id. at
1224.

87
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The most routine sort of undermatching is matching on the basis of
name alone. However, as Erving Goffman has pointed out, the personal
name as an identity marker, while the most commonly used, is at the
same time far from the most reliable.89 The doubt is particularly high
with relatively common names. Undermatching has been visible lately
in the mishaps of the Transportation Security Administration’s “No Fly”
List, where travelers unfortunate enough to have a name the same as or
similar to that of a suspected terrorist target are pulled aside for
questioning.90 Similarly, in the 2000 election, some Florida voters were
turned away from the polls as being ineligible to vote based simply on
the match of their names to names on a list of convicted felons pulled
together by a data aggregator.91 The rise in the sheer number of
American consumers indicates that relying merely on personal names to
tie an event to an individual is increasingly risky, at least where the
event is disconnected from that individual so that no party to the
transaction is familiar with any other. Given that more than 2.9 million
individuals reside in the United States, the chances that many of them
will have duplicate names appear to be quite high.92 Thus, matching by
name alone appears foolishly to invite misattribution.
Additionally, undermatching is often to blame when an aggregator
poisons an individual’s financial transaction biography with an identity
thief’s transactions. A data provider will report an account using the
identifying information provided by the thief. While often the name and
social security number attached to the thief’s transaction will match
those on the victim’s biography, nonetheless other identity pegs
provided by a thief that would pinpoint identity, such as date of birth,
place of birth, address, and telephone number, will conflict with those in

GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 58; see also CECIL ROLPH, PERSONAL IDENTITY (1957).
Complaint, Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (W.D. Wash. 2005) No. CV04-0763. The
ACLU has filed a class action complaint against the Transportation Security
Administration, among others, alleging that hundreds of innocent travelers have been
detained because they have names similar or identical to those on the “No Fly” list,
notwithstanding that they have no ties to terrorist activities. Id. According to the ACLU’s
complaint, the No-Fly List includes additional identity markers for its members, including
date of birth, nationalities, and passport numbers, but the list nonetheless is incomplete
and inaccurate. Id. ¶ 20.
91
Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name Purge Denied Some the Right to Vote, WASH. POST, May
31, 2001, at A01. The aggregator, DBT Technologies, has since been acquired by
ChoicePoint. Id.
92
State and County Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2007). The United States Census Bureau estimates that the number of
people in the United States in 2005 was 296,410,404—an increase of 5.3% from 2000. Id.
89
90
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the aggregator’s database.93 When the aggregator runs its matching
algorithm through its warehouse, the algorithm pulls up the fraudulent
accounts, matching only an inadequate number of identity markers
while disregarding additional identity markers that conflict with the
victim’s information.94
The advances in data technology have contributed to errors by
undermatching. The risk of undermatching arises not just because so
many people have the same name as someone else, but because the pool
of collected data has grown so large. A data aggregator that culled only
data from one particular area, geographic or demographic, would run a
lower risk of collecting records that bear the same name, but nevertheless
refer to two (or even more) different individuals.
Furthermore, undermatching increases when we disaggregate the
doer from the deed. The record, once it leaves the context of the original
event, becomes skinned of the additional identifying attributes that
context provides. For example, the record of a James Jones in a certain
doctor’s office will be identified by the other identity markers the office
may use that do not become part of the record. The office staff may be
perfectly able to keep their two James Joneses apart, whether because of
office filing practices or because they suffer from different ailments or
because of some other distinction. But once the record leaves that
context, it loses those markers and must compete with other records of
other James Joneses.
b.

Fuzzy matching

The second main type of mismatched transactional information
arises not from undermatching, but from fuzzy matching.95 Fuzzy
matching imposes vagueness on identity markers, blurring precision.
Vagueness can be imposed at the level of a given individual marker, for
example, where the name James Jones is deemed to match Jim Jones and
Jimmy Jones. The vagueness can also be imposed at the next level up,
where multiple markers are matched. For instance, a record will be
matched to a person if the name and the city of residence match, even if
93
See Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003)
(where provider who had reported an account opened by an identity thief as being the
plaintiff’s, even though the plaintiff’s name, Lori Wade, differed substantially from the
name the thief used, Lori White).
94
See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
95
See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1048
(1993) (noting that in computing and logic usage, “fuzzy” can be “defined so as to allow for
imprecise set-membership”).
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other markers, such as date of birth, do not. So, for example, one data
aggregator, a consumer reporting agency, misattributed a bankruptcy of
a “Donela Reed” to her brother “Donel.”96 In addition to similar names,
the siblings had similar social security numbers; nonetheless, the names,
social security numbers, and, obviously, genders of the two individuals
were distinctly different.97 The fuzziness calls a match even though the
two sets of identity markers, while overlapping, do not match entirely.
For example, the aggregator may identify a record to an individual with
a similar, yet distinctly different, last name if the first names match.98
Aggregators’ algorithms, which search through the data warehouse for
records with similar, but not identical, identifying information use fuzzy
matching to collect transactional biographies.99
Fuzziness will often poison the data sea by falsely attributing one
person’s action to another. However, some fuzziness may lead to
accurate attribution, which is why data aggregators employ it. An
accurate reputation may in fact depend on imprecise or unverifiable
information. As Samuel Johnson once said, “If a man could say nothing
against a character but what he can prove, history could not be
written.”100 If the only transactions that could be ascribed to an
individual were those for which the doer’s identity had been fully
verified, many who depend on aggregators’ reports to accurately portray
the image of the individual would be misled. For example, a James Jones
may in fact have signed his name as Jim, and to reject that record on the
basis of the mismatch in first names would lead to a financial biography
for James Jones that portrays a truncated image, leading to an inaccurate
reputation.
Nonetheless, errors from fuzzy matching could be
minimized by verifying the match of additional markers that are
unlikely to vary, such as the date or place of birth.
D. Inaccuracies in the Data Warehouses
Not all misattributions of transactions lead to litigation, but those
that do indicate that mismatching errors are hardly unavoidable. An
aggregator may match records even when the names have only a passing
resemblance. For example, one data aggregator attributed the account of
Reed v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111-12 (D. Minn. 2004).
Id.
98
See, e.g., McKeown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 925-26 (W.D. Wis.
2004) (agency matched record of the death of an individual named McOwen to the
plaintiff, notwithstanding the difference in names).
99
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
100
JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 727 (1998).
96
97
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an identity thief who had used the name “Lori White” to someone
named “Lori Wade.”101 Similarly, in McKeown v. Sears, a consumer
reporting agency attributed the account of a James N. McOwen to the
plaintiff, James McKeown.102 The plaintiff learned of the misattribution
when he tried to apply for credit, and an agency issued a credit report
for him indicating that he was dead.103 The error arose because Sears
had noted in its own files that an account holder named James N.
McOwen had died, but the note lacked additional identity markers,
raising a real risk of undermatching.104 Later, Sears matched the report
of death with the plaintiff’s account number, apparently by fuzzily, very
fuzzily, matching the record by name to the plaintiff, even though the
two had different middle initials, different numbers of letters in their last
names, and different arrangements of those letters.105 Two consumer
reporting agencies then published the deceased notation.106 Thus,
through a combination of fuzzy matching and undermatching, the
plaintiff was reputed to be dead.
Even matching first names and last names can lead an aggregator to
wrongfully ascribe one individual’s act to another. For example, in Jones
v. Credit Bureau of Great Garden City, Inc.,107 the defendant, a consumer
reporting agency, had ascribed to a “James R. Jones” the debt of a “James
D. Jones.”108 The agency made this match notwithstanding that the two
individuals had different middle initials, different addresses, and
different dates of birth.109 Even if such fuzzy matching were an
appropriate way to ascribe information in the case of a rare surname, it
seems downright rash in the case of a last name such as “Jones,”
especially when combined with a relatively common first name. The
court agreed, finding that the consumer reporting agency could be
negligent for failing to verify the identity of the debtor.110 In a similar
Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003).
McKeown, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 925-26.
103
Id. at 925. The court denied the motion of a consumer reporting agency, Trans Union,
to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under the FCRA. Id. at 925-26, 935. In response to the
plaintiff’s dispute, the agency reaffirmed the validity of the match. Id. Even though Sears
reaffirmed the identity of the account, it noted that the name on the account differed from
the one the agency provided with the dispute. Id.
104
Id. at 924.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
No. 87-1302-C, 1989 WL 107747 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 1989).
108
Id. at **3-4.
109
Id.
110
Id. at *7. The injured debtor and his wife brought a claim pursuant to the FCRA. Id.
The court was unimpressed with the agency’s matching techniques: “Defendants’ transfer
of information from one debtor’s credit file into another debtor’s credit file is undoubtedly
101
102
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fashion, a consumer reporting agency mixed together the financial
events of a “William Daniel Thompson, Jr.” and “William Douglas
Thompson, III,” notwithstanding that the records’ identifying
information included different social security numbers, different
addresses, and different occupations.111
Some aggregators’ fuzzy matching policies seem nearly designed to
create false biographies. For example, one agency has used an algorithm
that attributes a record to an individual if any two of the identity markers
matches, yet deems the name marker matched if the main name, without
any suffix such as “junior,” matches.112 Furthermore, the agency may
verify the match even after a misidentified individual challenges it.113
This, predictably, will create false virtual images whenever a father and
an adult son named after him live at the same address. The image
portrayed by the aggregator’s report will be a mish-mash of the two, the
reputation true to neither.
Fuzzy matching of public records can also lead an aggregator to
falsely report that one individual’s bankruptcy was filed by another. A
consumer reporting agency reported one woman’s bankruptcy in the
name of another woman who lived in a different town, was born on a
different day, and had a different middle name and a different social
security number.114 In another case of false attribution of bankruptcy, a
mortgagee reported that the bankruptcy of one co-obligor on a mortgage
was in fact that of the other, notwithstanding that the two had dissimilar
names and that the non-bankrupt borrower had continued to pay the
debt.115

a serious and significant act which calls for more precautions than a similarity of names.”
Id.; see also Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M. 2006)
(denying agency’s motion for summary judgment where two women shared the same
name and seven digits of their social security numbers but nothing else).
111
Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982)
(affirming lower court’s judgment that a consumer reporting agency’s verification process
that did not require sufficient “points of correspondence” between the consumer and the
file or did not have an adequate auditing procedure to foster accuracy, violated the FCRA).
112
Moore v. Equifax Info. Servs. L.L.C., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(denying agency’s motion for summary judgment on claim brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681e, 1681i (2000)).
113
Id.
114
Kenneth R. Gosslein & Matthew Kauffman, A Credit Trap for Consumers, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 26, 2003, at A1.
115
Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Additionally, criminal record information can be particularly
damaging, yet is also especially subject to mismatching errors.116 In fact,
the poor quality of compiled “[r]ap sheets” was one reason the Supreme
Court upheld the denial of a Freedom of Information Act request to
obtain such documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
Press.117 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, blamed the poor quality
of the sheets on the amount of information: “Because of the volume of
rap sheets, they are sometimes incorrect or incomplete and sometimes
contain information about other persons with similar names.”118 That
was in 1989; since then, the volume of personally identifiable
information has grown tremendously.
Not just individuals have data mismatched; businesses can suffer
from undermatching and fuzzy matching as well. In one commercial
defamation case, the plaintiff, County Vanlines, Inc., sued a consumer
reporting agency for defamation after it was denied a loan because the
agency had sent the intended lender information about negative credit
events that were incurred by a business with the similar but, nonetheless,
distinctly different name of County Van and Storage, Inc.119 The agency
did so notwithstanding that the transactions took place before the target
moving company had even incorporated.120 The defendant justified the
loosely-matching algorithm on the grounds that precision would
eliminate accurate and relevant data.121
These cases indicate that some credit reporting agencies do relatively
little meaningful matching of the data already in their data warehouses
116
See, e.g., Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 412-14 (4th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff had applied for a job and had truthfully represented on the application that he
had not been convicted of a felony, although he had been convicted of a misdemeanor. Id.
at 417. The investigating agency uncovered the misdemeanor as part of the background
check, but misreported it as a felony based on the erroneous opinion of the county clerk,
which the agency did not verify. Id. The court of appeals vacated summary judgment,
which was favorable to the agency, based on a factual dispute raised by the plaintiff’s claim
that the agency had violated the FCRA by failing to use reasonable procedures to assure
the maximum possible accuracy of the information in the plaintiff’s report. Id.
117
489 U.S. 749, 752 (1989). The Court held that the FBI could deny access to the rap
sheets pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), which allows an agency to deny a FOIA request
for “law enforcement records or information about a private citizen” if disclosure could
“reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy.” Id. at 780.
118
Id. at 752.
119
County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
120
Id. at 386.
121
Id. at 388-89 (reciting testimony of the technical manager of the defendant).
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before attributing events to a particular individual, leading to the high
risk that the individual was not in fact the person who participated in
that event.
E. The Power of Bad Data
In sum, advances in information technology have led to businesses,
creditors, and others storing digital records of consumers’ financial
transactions.
Technology has helped speed the duplication and
distribution of these sorts of records. Data aggregators can then
warehouse and analyze them, both for the benefit of those with which an
individual currently does business and for those that would like to find
new individuals with whom to do business. In this way, transactional
biographies develop, creating a virtual image. However, errors abound
in the sea of data, a “frothy Chaos” of undermatched and fuzzily
matched information that taints people’s biographies with gossip and
rumors.122 Accordingly, the image that observers treat as though it
faithfully represents someone may not in fact do so. However, how
important are these errors? What impact can a false biography have on
individuals and on society at large?
How does such digitized
information have more power than its print version? As discussed
below, it has so much power that it can effectively shut a consumer out
of the opportunity to enter into new transactions.
The same characteristics of digitized, networked data that give it so
much power pertain to that data even when it is false. While
information about individuals has never been perfectly accurate,
inaccurate data has more impact now than ever for the same reasons that
accurate data does.123 First, data is much more accessible than it used to
be. Accordingly, what errors might have been seen by just a few
viewers—albeit viewers who could possibly have great power over the
subject of that news (as one imagines William the Conqueror had)—can
now be released onto the Worldwide Web and accessed anywhere by
anyone with an Internet connection. Furthermore, the information age
has detached data from the original actor and from the transaction that
created it, which means that the observer of the electronic record may
never perceive any supplemental information that could correct or
ameliorate misattributed information held in a physical record. Because
the data and its creators, storers, and users are often so detached from
the person to whom it pertains, it may be far more difficult for an
122
123

Montaigne, supra note 2.
See infra text accompanying notes 131-33.
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individual to correct it. A false report of someone’s death in a small
community, for example, could be easily remedied simply by the aliveand-well person appearing, in the flesh, before the person who started
the rumor. If the data were in a paper record, that record could be
corrected. The person could similarly appear before those who had been
falsely told (or had read) of the death. The chances that the original
record had been copied many times were likely small and, by correcting
the original, the individual could be reasonably sure that any copies in
the future would omit the inaccurate item. Now, however, an individual
may learn of a false attribution only after the record has been copied and
distributed far and wide and, even if able to correct it at the original
source, may have no ability to retrieve all the bad copies.
Face-to-face transactions have yielded to the convenience and
efficiency of electronic ones, and information generated from those
transactions gains impact because it is much less likely to be paired with
or ameliorated by first-hand impressions. For example, a mortgage
decision might well come down to a simple credit score,124 a number
sprung from information, whether accurate or not, linked to one’s credit
history, without the lender ever meeting the applicant face-to-face.125
Even if the borrower actually meets with a lender’s representative, that
representative will likely rely on reports generated not from (or at least

See infra text accompanying note 134.
The 2003 revisions to the FCRA define a credit score as follows:
(i) . . . a numerical value or a categorization derived from a statistical
tool or modeling system used by a person who makes or arranges a
loan to predict the likelihood of certain credit behaviors, including
default (and the numerical value or the categorization derived from
such analysis may also be referred to as a “risk predictor” or “risk
score”); and
(ii) does not include—
(I) any mortgage score or rating of an automated
underwriting system that considers one or more factors in
addition to credit information, including the loan to value
ratio, the amount of down payment, or the financial assets of
a consumer; or
(II) any other elements of the underwriting process or
underwriting decision.
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 212(b) (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(2)(A) (2000)). As
amended, the Act requires agencies to disclose credit scores to consumers upon request.
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 212(b) (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(1)). Credit scores have
even been used by airlines to screen passengers for potential security risks. Donna
Havorsen, For Some, Use of Credit Scores Doesn’t Add Up, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Mar. 13, 2003, at 1A.
124
125
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not solely from) the lender’s own experiences with the borrower, but
from those of many others.126
Aside from practical damages such as these, however, false
attribution of others’ deeds damages the dignity of a person as well.
Both of these types of damages are discussed below.
1.

Tangible Damages to Reputation

The “digital dossier” of our commercial transactions with others has
enormous power:127 it can determine whether and on what terms a
person can obtain a credit card, rent an apartment, buy a home, get a
particular job, or obtain utility service.128 The dossier has this power
regardless of whether the information within it is true. The creditor,
landlord, mortgagor, or business will decide whether to do business with
an individual and, if so, the terms of that business, based on the history
prepared by the data aggregator, regardless of the accuracy of that
reported history.
For our purposes, “reputation” refers to the perception of the
community of the construct, the constitutive parts, of the individual.129
False data that is negative damages that perception by lowering the
estimation of the person in the eyes of those that check for worthiness to
participate in commercial transactions. Observers identify the image of a
person with the person as he or she really is. Accordingly, a reputation
arising from the image created by the mis-merged information will
nonetheless be treated as true to that individual.
As discussed above, mismatching errors on credit reports are
common, and they are far from harmless.130 The Consumer Federation
of America reported in 2002 that errors in consumer credit reports could
cost consumers millions of dollars in higher costs for credit.131 A 2004
See also HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 40-45.
See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1-2, 49.
128
A regulatory agency may allow a utility company to demand a deposit from a
residential applicant based on the credit history attributed to an individual. See, e.g., 83 ILL
ADMIN. CODE § 280.50(a) (2006) (allowing utility companies to demand a deposit from
residential service applicant’s whose credit scores fail to meet the service’s standards).
129
See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
130
See supra text accompanying notes 87-88, 93-98.
131
CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86. Of the credit reports reviewed, 29%
contained serious errors—false delinquencies or accounts that did not belong to the
consumer—that could cause a creditor to deny credit. Id. at 6. In 2003, the U.S. General
Accounting Office concluded that more study concerning the accuracy of credit reports is
needed. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER CREDIT: LIMITED INFORMATION EXISTS
126
127
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study found that one in four of the credit reports reviewed contained
errors sufficiently serious to cause a creditor to deny credit; many of
these errors were bankruptcies, accounts, and other items that did not
belong to the identified individual.132
To illustrate the crippling effects that mismatching of electronic data
can cause, we will use a fictional individual, Charlie Consumer, who has
led a fairly ordinary life, transaction-wise. Somewhere else a Charley
Consumer, who has the same last name and a similar first name to our
subject’s, has lived the life of a deadbeat. The two may live near one
another and may even have similar social security numbers.
Nonetheless, the two have no other identity markers in common—that
is, they have different dates of birth, different places of birth, different
(though perhaps similar) social security numbers, and so forth.
Charley-the-scoundrel acquires a credit card from a credit card
company and uses it to mount up debts that he failed to pay. The credit
card company records the delinquency and reports it, associated with
the name, address, date of birth, social security number, and telephone
number of the originating Charley, to a consumer reporting agency to
which the company subscribes. The agency stores the record in its vast
data warehouse, where it stays until called up.
This record, if fuzzily matched to the creditworthy Charlie, can
devastate his ability to develop and live his life. It can keep him from
buying a house,133 or perhaps allow him to do so only at a much higher
interest rate.134 In effect, Charlie is charged with being someone who
ON THE EXTENT OF CREDIT REPORT ERRORS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 17
(July 31, 2003).
132
CASSIDY & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 62, at 6, 11. The study by the Massachusetts
Public Interest Research Group in 2004 of 154 consumers and their credit reports found that
79% of the credit reports contained mistakes. Id. at 4. One in four contained serious errors
that could result in the denial of credit; nearly one in three contained credit accounts listed
as open that had been closed by the consumer. Id.
133
See infra text accompanying note 134.
134
See McCloud v. Homeside, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (plaintiff whose
former mortgage lender wrongfully reported her as delinquent could qualify only for
“‘sub-prime’” financing at an elevated rate); Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 2d 873, 876-77 (D. Minn. 2004) (alleging that an erroneous mismatch led a mortgagee
to offer plaintiff an interest rate one half percent higher on a fifteen year loan); McKeown v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 925-926 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (plaintiff who was
falsely matched with the record of a dead individual lost the opportunity for a thirty-year
fixed mortgage and instead had to take an adjusted rate mortgage with only the first five
years fixed); Gordon v. Greenpoint Credit, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1009 (S.D. Iowa 2003)
(erroneous credit report caused two lenders to deny plaintiffs a loan and a third lender to
offer a loan at an elevated rate).
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largely lived the same life as he did, but who incurred this bad debt. The
bank, however, treats the blended image of Charlie and Charley as being
a true portrayal of Charlie’s transaction history. Charlie’s reputation for
creditworthiness has suffered from the mismatch of Charley’s
information to his identity.
If Charlie seeks instead to rent a home, a report containing Charley’s
bad debt may keep him from being able to do so.135 It may also prevent
him from getting a job.136 Employers may rescind a job offer, or even fire
an employee, if dissatisfied with the individual’s financial history.137 In
fact, employers commonly scan this kind of information; according to
one survey, more than one-third of employers surveyed used credit
reports to screen candidates.138
By the time Charlie learns through these denials and rejections that
his biography has been contaminated by false information, it may be too
late to repair the image that the inaccurate biography projects. For
example, one consumer lost his job after a consumer reporting agency
incorrectly ascribed a drug conviction to him, when in fact the conviction
had been incurred by a man with the same first and last name, but with a
different middle name and date of birth.139 In such cases, the consumer
has no right to delay the decision while the record is corrected.

Motoko Rich, TURF; A Blacklist for Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at F1 (describing
suit brought against tenant screening agency alleging that the company provided
incomplete and inaccurate information). Many landlords use tenant screening companies
that aggregate information from, among other sources, consumer reporting agencies. Id.;
see Josh Barbanel, Residential Real Estate; Suit Disputes the Accuracy of Tenant Screening
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B8 (describing tenants who were unable to rent new
apartments because a tenant screening company reported that they had been involved in
housing lawsuits, even where suits were resolved in the tenants’ favor).
136
See, e.g., Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D.D.C. 1993) (involving
suit arising after plaintiff was fired because agency reported felony drug conviction in
name of James Ray Wiggins to the plaintiff’s identity, James Russell Wiggins, even though
their dates of birth differed); see also supra text accompanying note 125. Although the FCRA
requires employers to obtain a job applicant’s consent to the credit search, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) (2000), nothing prevents an employer from conditioning an offer on such
consent.
137
See HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 4-6.
138
Andrea Coombes, Job Seeker’s Obstacle: Bad Credit (June 17, 2004), http://www.market
watch.com/news/story/story.aspx?siteid=mktw&guid=%7B282DE3FC-0D52-4211-AB1FA07A0A35CEFD%7D. Federal law requires employers to obtain the employee’s or
applicant’s consent, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), but the employer may fire the employee or
deny the application if consent is refused. Id.
139
Wiggins v. Dist. Cablevision, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 484, 488-89 (D.D.C. 1994) (an example
of fuzzy matching); see also Nelski v. Ameritech, No. 244644, 2004 WL 1460001, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (the defendant, a mobile telephone services provider, opened up an
135
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Just as a tainted credit record may deny him the ability to find a
place to live or work, it may prevent Charlie from buying or leasing a
car.140 It may prevent him from obtaining additional credit cards.
Possibly worse, his existing credit card company could routinely scour
the records aggregated at agencies for signs of instability, and use the
record of the delinquent account to invoke a universal default clause that
allows the card company to raise the interest rate on a charge account
that Charlie really does own, a financial consequence that could in fact
cause the very default that Charlie had thus far been able to avoid.141
Charlie may even lose existing credit cards entirely.142 Likewise, Charlie
could be charged higher insurance premiums or even lose insurance—
life, property, or health—altogether.143 Bad credit, even if not the
responsibility of the consumer, can prevent a consumer from obtaining
student loans, delaying or even eliminating the opportunity for a college
degree.
All of these consequences, although terrible in the aggregate, appear
to be merely monetary. However, misattributed information can
threaten not just finances, but liberty itself. If Charley develops a
criminal history, that history could imperil Charlie. In one dramatic
example of undermatching identifying information, a bank opened up
an account in the name of an identity theft victim, even though the thief
used only the victim’s temporary license, which had no photograph, and
the signature on the account application did not match the signature on
the license.144 The thief then wrote several bad checks and the defrauded

account for an identity thief in the plaintiff’s name and continued to report the account as
hers even three years after it appeared to have acknowledged its error).
140
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 951 F.2d 905, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1991)
(granting creditor’s motion for summary judgment on FCRA claim based on lender’s false
report that borrower had defaulted on her car loan payments, an error that caused her to be
rejected for another car purchase).
141
See Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card Woes for Millions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at sec. 1, col. 5, p. 1.
142
See McMillan v. Experian, 170 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2001) (defendant had
merged records of the plaintiff’s son, who had the same name as the plaintiff, into the
plaintiff’s report, leading a credit card company to terminate plaintiff’s card and an insurer
to deny insurance).
143
For example, in Boris v. ChoicePoint Servs., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855 (W.D. Ky.
2003), a consumer reporting agency falsely ascribed to the plaintiff five different claims that
she had not made, leading her insurance company to send her a nonrenewal notice. See
also Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 443, 275 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
(upholding claim against physician where physician had reported false information to the
Medical Information Bureau, a data aggregator, which led to the plaintiff’s insurer cutting
off the plaintiff’s disability benefits).
144
Patrick v. Union St. Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Ala. 1996).
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merchants sought recovery, which led to warrants being issued in eleven
different jurisdictions for the victim’s arrest. Although the victim was
able to get those warrants of which she learned dismissed by showing
that the signatures on the checks did not match hers, she was eventually
arrested on other warrants and imprisoned in four different jurisdictions
over a period of ten days before finally winning her release.145 Similarly,
a check cashing service falsely imputed to a store clerk that a customer
was part of a “fraud ring,” which caused the customer to be arrested and
imprisoned.146 This case illustrates the difficulties of correcting such
misinformation; the consumer stayed imprisoned for ninety days, even
though the agency learned within one day that the information was
incorrect.147
Nonetheless, monetary consequences are more common. However,
those consequences may arise not as a direct result of the record’s
presence in the biography, but from the impact of that record on a
person’s credit score. The mismatched information may not even appear
directly before a creditor. Users will make decisions based not on a
reading of the entire report, but on the basis of an individual’s credit
score, an algorithm that numerically weighs the information about a
consumer.148 The Fair Isaac Corporation produces credit scoring
software that creditors use to determine access to credit and pricing of
credit for consumers.149 That score can determine whether a consumer
receives credit and, if so, at what price.150 A score too low will render a
145
Id. A similarly sinister version of identity theft is criminal record identity theft, where
an impostor commits one or more crimes in the victim’s name by providing the victim’s
identity to law enforcement when caught. See Beth Givens, Identity Theft: The Growing
Problem of Wrongful Criminal Records, Presentation at the SEARCH National Conference
on Privacy, Technology and Criminal Justice Information in Washington, D.C. (June 1,
2000), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/wcr.htm; see also Michael W. Perl, Comment, It’s
Not Always About the Money: Why the State Identity Theft Laws Fail to Adequately Address
Criminal Record Identity Theft, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 169, 169-71 (2003) (discussing
criminal record identity theft and “‘reverse criminal record identity theft’” where the thief
uses the victim’s personal information to hide the thief’s own criminal record).
146
Haque v. CompUSA, Inc., No. 02-10345-RWZ, 2003 WL 117986, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 13,
2003) (denying agency’s motion to dismiss the consumer’s FCRA claim; the court also ruled
that the plaintiff stated a claim for false imprisonment against the agency).
147
Id. at *1.
148
See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
149
See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 41 (noting the tremendous impact of
credit scoring companies on the access to “essential consumer services,” and pointing out
that “[m]any decision makers who use scoring systems to evaluate consumer applications
do not even understand the systems themselves . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
150
My Fico, http://www.myfico.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). The Fair Isaac
Corporation Web site identifies interest rates available to consumers in various ranges of
credit scores that fall between 500 and 850. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 6

1096 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

consumer subject to the sub-prime loan market, at great increased cost to
the consumer.151 In fact, a score too low may even prevent a consumer
from being able to open a checking account at a bank.152 The practice of
feeding information into an algorithm to produce a number—one three
digit number—that purports to assess an individual’s worthiness to
participate in future transactions also has increased the power of false
data on consumers’ lives. Under the general rule of garbage-in-garbageout, a false piece of information associated with a consumer may well
drag down that consumer’s credit score, depending on the weight the
credit scoring algorithm assigns to that item. However, neither the user
nor the individual will know from the score itself that a false item
deflated it.
One study estimated that one in five consumers was likely to be
assigned a lower score than deserved because of errors or inconsistencies
in that consumer’s credit history.153 The study further estimated that
inaccurate financial biographies put tens of millions of consumers at risk
of suffering higher-priced credit, or even being eliminated from the
credit market.154 Many such consumers cannot afford the damage that
the mismatched information will do to their ability to pay their bills.
While a consumer could choose to pay cash for everything, even going
“off-the-grid” will not avoid the consequences of the information, and a
consumer may well be stuck with denying the acts of his or her distorted
image projected from the computerized record. Furthermore, to the
extent that an individual’s life is held up by a false credit item, the
individual is not fully participating in the benefits of being an American
consumer. Thus, mismatching of transactions can have a devastating
impact on a person’s ability to find work and shelter and to live
affordably. As discussed below, it can also cause intangible but
nonetheless genuine damage to personality and dignity.
2.

Damage to Personality and Dignity

Transactions with others express an individual personality, defined
by Margaret Radin as “a continuing character structure encompassing
future projects or plans, as well as past events and feelings.”155
Obviously, a transactional biography can reveal past events. However,
See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 37-38.
Harriet Johnson Brackey, Banks Check Potential Customers’ Credit, MIAMI HERALD, Dec.
5, 2004, at 1E; see also HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 3-4.
153
See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 37.
154
See id. at 36-37.
155
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968 (1982).
151
152
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the individual items can also reveal a personal gestalt that can hold
enough of the essence of an individual to predict future projects or
plans—after all, that is why third parties seek it, to predict future
behavior. Thus, the record of transactions radiates an image of
personality, though perhaps an imperfect one. Outsiders can compute
from the individual acts an estimate of that person’s character with
respect to a particular trait—in other words, a reputation.
As
individuals, we express our personalities through our transactions: the
stores we patronize, the items we buy, from books to toothpaste, the
charities and causes that we support, the persons we call, and even, or
perhaps especially, the Web sites we visit. In the digital age, that self is
constructed for many interested watchers by external automated
processes. When the choices of another are attributed to us, we lose
control over the images that others believe faithfully represent our
choices.
While reputation is external to the self, existing in the minds of
others,156 under the Kantian characterization, dignity is a matter of
intrinsic worth that recognizes that each person merits being
acknowledged as an “individual and independent personality.”157 By
recognizing dignity we acknowledge a person’s right to freely develop
that person’s personality.158 Arguably, information aggregation itself
violates human dignity by depersonalizing individuals and treating
them as mere objects to some other ends.159 However, damage to dignity
worsens when the information is misaggregated to attribute a deed to
the wrong doer.
To mischaracterize someone’s personality is to injure his dignity.
Robert C. Post writes of the concept of reputation as dignity, drawing on
the sociological research of Erving Goffman to argue that dignity “is a
ritual and ceremonial aspect of the self that we associate with the self’s
integrity[.]”160 The observer of an exchange between a person and a
Heyman, supra note 16, at 1325.
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 255 (Mary Gregor trans. 1991); see
also Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 972 n.36 (citing Life Imprisonment Case, 45
BVerfGE 187, 228 (1977), translated in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 314 (1994)); William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human
Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47
(Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Parent eds., 1992).
158
Eberle, supra note 157, at 972.
159
Id. at 1001.
160
See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 708-10 (1986). Post also described the concept of
156
157
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speaker who speaks falsely about that person may have to choose which
image—the true or the false—to believe.161 If the observer sides with the
speaker, the person is discredited (literally, as far as creditworthiness is
concerned).162 The person becomes subject to “‘exclusion from belonging
as a respected and responsible’ member of society[,]” losing dignity.163
Even where the false attribution of an action does not cause substantive
harm to a person’s reputation, as Steven Heyman points out, it can
“nevertheless violate her dignity as an autonomous being,” regardless of
whether the specific item of information is derogatory or not, by treating
that person as a “mere object rather than an active subject.”164
However, the attribution of events to a person who did not do them
injures dignity in a manner different from that of depersonalization, of
person as object. By falsely attributing an event to an actor, the
attributor damages the individual’s right to self-determination by
inflicting the consequences of the false attribution on the individual. The
individual may be denied the ability to have the same interactions with
others that would otherwise be possible and the individual’s realm of
choices may be unjustly circumscribed. This is because others may
choose to change their own course of action based on the false
information, either choosing not to play with the misrepresented
individual or by changing the terms on which they will play. The
individual’s ability to author his or her future is hampered by not his or
her own past, but by that of someone else; personality as well as dignity
is damaged. However, the primary legal structures that exist to protect
one’s reputation for purposes of participating in the marketplace do not
sufficiently motivate data providers and aggregators to identify
transactions more accurately, as discussed below.
III. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT AND ITS FLAWS
However much misattributed information may damage reputations,
thereby inflicting not only tangible financial damage, but also damage to
personality and dignity, victims of misattributed information have little
reputation as property, earned through one’s own hard work, which is treated as a private
good and accorded value by the market. Id. at 693-99.
161
Id. at 711.
162
Id.
163
Id. (quoting Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 323 (1986)).
164
Heyman supra note 16, at 1339. Of course, if a false statement about someone does not
cause injury to that person’s reputation, it is not defamatory. Id. Nonetheless, the
statement may be actionable under the tort of false light invasion of privacy, which
Heyman describes as “protecting the dignitary dimension of reputation.” Id.
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effective recourse for these injuries, despite the legal maxim ubi jus, ibi
remedium, for every right there shall be a remedy.165 Protection of
reputation was originally the province of common law, through the torts
of defamation and false light.166 However, now the federal FCRA (or
“the Act”) is the primary legal tool designed to promote the accuracy
and integrity of transactional biographies, at least with respect to
personal information used for credit, insurance, or employment
purposes.
But this Act inadequately protects individuals from the
consequential and emotional damages caused by misattributed acts for
several reasons. First, it only imposes meaningful accuracy requirements
on data providers and data aggregators after the false information has
already been reported.167 Second, the Act overprotects data aggregators
and providers by limiting private suits, preempting state laws, and
giving qualified immunity from state torts to those who must comply
with the Act.168 Though that qualified immunity mimics a privilege
recognized widely at common law in defamation actions, courts have
read the Act’s version with far too much deference to the industry’s
interests, insufficiently valuing the impact bad information has on a
modern consumer’s life.
The FCRA was developed to solve the problem of misattributed
information. More than thirty-five years ago, once computers began to
take over the chores of aggregating and sorting data, Congress began to
recognize the power of widely available, aggregated data, the lack of
power individuals had over the collection and use of such data, and the
likelihood that some data could get assigned to the wrong person. 169

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1761 (8th ed. 1990).
See W.S. Holdsworth, Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 40 L.Q. REV. 302, 303-05
(1924) (discussing the development of defamation in the common law courts of England).
167
See infra text accompanying notes 176-93.
168
See infra text accompanying notes 235-39.
169
One member of Congress expressed the fears of many:
Undoubtedly the computerization of personal information about
millions of individuals gives this subject greater importance and
urgency then it had in the days when the average businessman knew
his customers personally and knew the good credit risks from the bad,
and the insurance agent was an old acquaintance who knew the
probably good actuarial risks from the probably bad ones. Today,
such data is almost completely second hand, third hand or even more
distant and impersonal, and it is almost impossible to find a human
being to unravel a computer error once it’s made. When the computer
is half a continent away and connected to the store by electronics, the
165
166
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Senator Proxmire, who led Congress in this reform effort, argued that
“We certainly would not tolerate a Government agency depriving a
citizen of his livelihood or freedom on the basis of unsubstantiated
gossip without an opportunity to present his case. And yet this is
entirely possible on the part of a credit reporting agency.”170 Eventually
Congress passed the original FCRA.171
However, the accuracy
provisions of the Act and many courts’ interpretations of those
provisions have not solved the problem of such “gossip” and have not
kept up with modern information practices.
Currently, the FCRA172 regulates the reporting of a broad category of
records: those that bear on an individual’s credit, character, general
reputation, or personal characteristics,173 if an agency communicates the
report for the purpose of determining a consumer’s eligibility for credit,
insurance, or employment.174 Anyone with a business need for the
information may obtain it.175 Given that so many transactions and so
much detail about those transactions are being stored and analyzed, the
volume of information subject to the Act expands every day.176
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Accuracy Provisions
The Act’s most significant flaw is that it imposes meaningful
accuracy requirements only after a false and negative item has been
reported, has already been put into the data sea. However, given that
remoteness of the customer from the real arbiter of his credit
worthiness becomes even more pronounced.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency
on H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (remarks of Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan).
170
115 CONG. REC. S2412 (1969) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). The discussions around
the Act also revealed some techno-phobia:
with the trend toward . . . the establishment of all sorts of
computerized data banks, the individual is in great danger of having
his life and character reduced to impersonal “blips” and key-punch
holes in a stolid and unthinking machine which can literally ruin his
reputation without cause, and make him unemployable.
116 CONG. REC. S36570 (1970) (remarks of Representative Sullivan). Inaccurate and
misleading information was seen as the most serious problem in the credit reporting
industry, and the impact of even a small percentage of errors was recognized: “Everyone is
a potential victim of an inaccurate credit report. If not today, then perhaps tomorrow.” 115
CONG. REC. S2411 (1969). As Senator Proxmire noted, even a one percent error rate would
lead to a million citizens having “reputations . . . unjustly maligned.” Id.
171
Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970).
172
FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 (Dec. 4, 2003).
173
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
174
Id. §§ 1681(a)(d)(1)(A)-(B).
175
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(F).
176
See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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digitized data is far more available, accessible, duplicatable, and
transmittable than old paper records, once a false record has been put
into the data sea, it is very hard to ever completely cull it out.
To provide an overview of the process regulated by the Act, as
discussed above, a record of the sort covered by the Act generally
originates with a business or governmental entity, which usually is the
creator of an electronic record of a transaction, or at least maintains the
record in that form.177 The business provides the information, along with
identity markers for the responsible individual, to a data aggregator,
called a consumer reporting agency in the Act.178 For example, a bank
may report that a car loan belongs to the identified consumer and that
the consumer has defaulted on it. The aggregator, or agency, collects the
information and warehouses it in vast databanks, ready to provide it to
any customer who asks for it.
The Act is designed to impose meaningful accuracy standards only
after inaccurate information has already been provided by a data
provider and reported by a data aggregator. The Act permits the
original data provider, called a furnisher under the Act, to furnish nearly
any item in a consumer’s name without first verifying that it belongs to
that consumer.179 But the Act only prohibits the furnisher from
furnishing information that the furnisher either “knows or has
reasonable cause to believe” to be inaccurate.180 A furnisher only has
“‘reasonable cause to believe that an item of information is inaccurate’” if
the furnisher has “specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the
consumer, that would cause a reasonable person to have substantial
doubts about the accuracy of the information.”181
Although Congress supplemented the initial accuracy standard in
2003 to prohibit a provider from furnishing information that a consumer
has notified the provider to be inaccurate,182 the supplement is largely
See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). The FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency to be “any
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties . . . .” Id.
179
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
180
Id. §§ 1681s-2(a)(1)(A), 1681s-2(a)(1)(D), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(b), 117
Stat. 1952 (2003).
181
Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(b), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003)
(emphasis added).
182
Id. § 1681 s-2(a)(1)(B), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(e), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
177
178
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cosmetic because of the qualifications that undermine it.183 In any event,
none of the standards imposed on data providers at the point of initially
furnishing data are meaningful because Congress specifically prohibited
injured consumers from the ability to enforce them.184
Thus, the agency acquires information that likely has not been
subjected to any scrutiny, let alone verified. The agency acquires the
information, either electronically or via magnetic tape from the provider,
and stores it electronically, where it sits until needed for a report. Just as
the Act imposes a relatively weak accuracy requirement on data
providers at the point of initial provision, the Act places only loose limits
on aggregators that then report the information. When a subscriber
requests a report on a particular consumer, the aggregator, the consumer
reporting agency, must only follow “reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy” of the information that it returns to the
subscriber.185 The provision does not in fact require agencies to ensure
the maximum possible accuracy of every item of information, or to do
much if anything to match, verify, or cross-check the information.186
Some courts have ruled that an agency need only look beneath the
surface identification if it has reason to suspect the accuracy of a source
of information.187 Furthermore, many courts have curtailed the effect of
Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B)(i). The furnisher need only comply with this second accuracy
obligation if the consumer notifies the furnisher at the furnisher’s designated address for
such information. Id. The Act exempts furnishers from the obligation to avoid furnishing
inaccurate information if the furnisher has specified to a consumer an address that the
consumer can use to notify the furnisher that the information is inaccurate. Id. § 1681s2(a)(1)(C). However, the Act does not require furnishers to provide such an inaccuracynotice address. Id. A furnisher that learns that it has furnished inaccurate data about a
consumer must also notify the agencies to which it has furnished the information of that
knowledge and correct the inaccuracy. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2). This requirement applies only to
furnishers who furnish consumer information “regularly and in the ordinary course of
business.” Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2)(A).
184
Id. § 1681s-2(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 312(e), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
185
Id. § 1681e(b).
186
FTC Official Staff Commentary § 607 item 3A, http://www.lawdog.com/CREDIT/
crta410.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007); see also Smith v. Auto Mashers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d
638, 641 (W.D. Va. 2000). An agency does not violate this provision “simply by reporting
an item of information that turns out to be inaccurate[,]” and dismissing the claim of the
plaintiff, who was fired after an agency reported that he’d failed a drug screen, when in
fact he had not. Smith, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
187
See, e.g., Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., 257 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2001); Pinner
v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 US. 1022 (1987) (where
agency knew of personal dispute between consumer and person reporting the contested
data to the agency, agency should not have relied on that person’s verification of the data
once the consumer disputed it); Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1982);
Thomas v. Gulf Coast Credit Servs., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234-35 (M.D. Ala. 2002)
(“blind reliance” on secondary sources that each offered the same inaccurate information
183
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the accuracy requirement by incorporating a balancing test clearly not in
the text of the Act, weighing “the potential that the information will
create a misleading impression against the availability of more accurate
[or complete] information and the burden of providing such
information.”188 Between the provision itself and the interpretations of
it, the Act signals to aggregators and furnishers that they can employ a
default rule of merely passing through, unvetted, details about a
transaction in a consumer’s name without fear of liability.
It is only after an individual has learned that an agency has falsely
charged him or her with negative data that the individual can require an
aggregator to examine the data. The maligned individual may demand
that the agency “reinvestigate” the inaccurate information, a term in the
Act that inaccurately suggests that the agency investigated the item to
begin with.189 The agency then can choose between reinvestigating the
information and deleting it.190 In fulfilling this accuracy obligation, the
agency must make a good faith effort to determine the accuracy of the
disputed item191—that is, the agency must do more than merely
reconfirm, pro forma, the identity of the consumer with the business that
originally provided the data.192 Thus, in theory, where another’s deeds
are wrongly attributed to an individual, the agency must make a good

about identity theft victim was not reasonable); Swoager v. Credit Bureau, 608 F. Supp. 972,
974 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (merely parroting furnisher’s information did not meet agency’s
obligation of reasonable reinvestigation).
188
Koropoulous v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1984) (vacating summary
judgment in favor of agency); Zotta v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1203
(E.D. Mo. 2003) (agency must do more than simply correctly report the information given
to it by the provider); see also Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(holding that this provision may require an agency to keep track of the accuracy of its
sources in order to prevent vaguely identified records from poisoning an individual’s file).
189
15 U.S.C. § 1681e. Presumably the term “reinvestigation” is used because the agency
should have previously done some investigation in accepting the data to begin with, as
required by § 1681e.
190
Id. § 1681(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
191
F.T.C. Official Staff Commentary § 611 item 2, http://www.lawdog.com/CREDIT/
crta414.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
192
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that
agency may not merely rely on a creditor’s information when an identity theft victim
challenged an account as not being his, and reversing lower court’s judgment for agency);
Zala v. Trans Union, L.L.C., No. 3:99-CV-0399, 2001 WL 210693, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
2001) (agency must inquire both of original creditor and of available public records). A
recent addition to the Act specifies that the agency’s reinvestigation must be “reasonable.”
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2003), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 317, 117 Stat.
1952 (2003).
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faith effort to verify the attribution with the provider once the injured
individual notifies the agency of the mismatch.193
The language of the reinvestigation provision creates a vision of a
thoughtful and professional clerk evaluating the consumer’s file in
earnest consultation with the original data provider.
However,
notwithstanding the responsibility, in fact the reinvestigation process is
nearly as automated as the transmission of the original information to
the agency. The agency will usually send the provider a Consumer
Dispute Verification form, whose automated form is known as an
Automated Consumer Dispute Verification Form.194 This process
reduces a defamed consumer’s anguished and detailed description of an
error to a generalized code.195
Once a data provider, a furnisher, receives this form, it must conduct
a reasonable investigation of the inaccurate information.196 If the original
193
Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225; Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286-87 (7th Cir.
1994).
194
The Role of the FCRA in the Credit Granting Process Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 6 (2003) (statement of Harry Gambill, Chief
Executive Officer, Trans Union, L.L.C.). According to one representative of a national
consumer reporting agency, 52% of its data providers use the automated consumer dispute
verification system. Id.; see also Anderson v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 345 F. Supp. 2d 963, 96667 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (describing automated process); McKeown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 335
F. Supp. 2d 917, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (same); Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 2d 873, 876-77 (D. Minn. 2004) (same).
195
HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 98-99 (describing the verification process). For example,
in a case where an agency misattributed a report of death to the plaintiff, the agency sent
an automated consumer dispute verification form with a two character code that produced
an automatic written message, “‘special comment, compliance condition and/or remarks
message disputed. Consumer not liable for acct. (i.e., ex-spouse, business). If liable
provide complete ID and ECOA [Equal Credit Opportunity Act] code.’” McKeown, 335 F.
Supp. 2d at 926.
196
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
The provider must reasonably investigate whether the provider can verify the item.
Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting provider’s
argument that the Act requires only a “minimal duty” to “briefly review” its records); see
also Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003)
(rejecting claim against provider who had reported an account opened by an identity thief
as being the plaintiff’s, even though the plaintiff’s name, Lori Wade, differed substantially
from the name the thief used, Lori White); Olwell v. Med. Info. Bureau, No. 01-1481
JRTFLN, 2003 WL 79035, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2003) (denying provider’s motion for
summary judgment where insurance company reported plaintiff as having failed a test that
detected smoking on the grounds that the provider could be required to contact outside
services to comply with its obligation to reinvestigate the information); Malm v. Household
Bank (SB), N.A., No. 03-434OADMAJB, 2004 WL 1559370, at * 5 (D. Minn. July 7, 2004)
(dismissing claim where provider did not learn that consumer’s wife had forged his
signature on credit card); Agosta v. Inovision, Inc., No. 02-806, 2003 WL 22999213, at *5
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provider cannot verify the item, the provider must “take steps to”
modify, delete, or block the information.197
In theory, any
mistranscription or misattribution error should be caught here, because
an inaccurately attributed record would not be verifiable. In any event,
the provider must then notify the agency of the results of its
investigation.198 Then the agency must not only notify the individual of
the results of the search, but also the provider when the agency corrects
or deletes inaccurate information as a result of the reinvestigation.199
In 2003, as part of an overhaul of the Act, Congress took steps to
curtail mismatching of information.200 However, instead of addressing
the careless matching practices of providers and agencies that lead to so
much poisoning of financial biographies, it focused on the subset of such
information arising from identity theft. Consumers may now require an
agency to put a fraud alert in any report on the consumer. The alerts
also impose new responsibilities on users to verify the identity of anyone
who applies for credit in the name of the victim.201 Furthermore,
nationwide credit reporting agencies will have to block theft-related

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2003); Betts v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where furnisher,
who sought to collect a debt incurred from towing an abandoned car, reported the debt as
belonging to the plaintiff, although plaintiff had successfully claimed in different suit that
she did not own the car); Kronstedt v. Equifax CSC, No. 01-C-0052-C, 2001 WL 34124783, at
*7, *17 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 14. 2001) (denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where
provider confirmed debt even though it had been notified that the plaintiff was a victim of
identity theft); Bruce v. First U.S.A. Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1143-44 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where provider had reported a card
taken out by the plaintiff’s ex-wife as belonging to plaintiff, even though he had repeatedly
notified the issuer of the fraud and the provider’s own investigation showed that the
signatures on the account application did not match plaintiff’s).
197
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). The provider need only do this for the purpose of
reporting information to the agency. Id.
198
Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(C).
199
Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 314(a), 117 Stat. 1995 (2003).
200
Id. § 1681c-1 (Supp. III 2003); see also 16 C.F.R § 603.2 (2006) (defining the terms
“identity theft” and “identifying information”).
201
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(h)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 112, 117
Stat. 1955 (2003). The Act as amended also requires businesses that have done business
with an identity thief in the victim’s name to provide the victim with information about the
transaction, such as providing the victim with the thief’s credit application. Id., added by
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 151, 117 Stat. 1961 (2003). However, the business does not become
obligated to cooperate until the victim has proven his or her own identity to the business’s
satisfaction. See id. § 1681g(e)(2). The irony being, of course, that if the business had
demanded appropriate identification of the thief’s identity, the victim would likely not
have become a victim. Id.
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debts from their files.202 Once a consumer submits an identity theft
report to a provider of bad data, the provider must cease furnishing the
fraudulent information in the victim’s name unless the provider
subsequently “knows” that the information is correct.203
These
provisions have the same flaw as the general accuracy provisions that
apply to ordinary data: they focus on the time after a data provider and
data aggregator have already attributed the thief’s information to the
victim, after the digitized records have been reported.
In short, the tepid standards that govern the initial provision of
information to aggregators and to those aggregators’ subscribers give
data providers and aggregators a free bite of the apple. They can sort of
shoot haphazardly for accuracy without having to take steps to target it.
Thus, the Act in practice has not effectively filtered bad information from
the pool of consumer data, nor has it protected consumers from the
harmful effects of such data.204 The most meaningful accuracy check—
the reinvestigation required of agencies and providers—does not arise
until after a consumer challenges a piece of misattributed information.
Realistically a consumer is not going to learn that an aggregator has
distorted the consumer’s biography with a mismatched record until the
aggregator has reported the item to a third party, a third party who is
likely checking the individual’s biography to determine the individual’s
worthiness for a particular benefit. Thus, a consumer has to suffer the
reporting of false information before being entitled to any review of the
substance of the information. By that time, the consumer may well have
suffered consequences to finances and to personal dignity that cannot
necessarily be undone. In the fictional example described above, Charlie
would suffer the loss of a mortgage and possibly even a job itself. He
could be denied insurance, and may even be arrested, all before being

Id. § 1681c-2(a) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 152(a), 117 Stat. 1964
(2003). The agency must notify the provider of the blocked information that it may have
arisen from an identity theft. Id. § 1681c-2(b)(1). Once notified, the data provider must
implement procedures to prevent them from re-providing the information. Id. § 1681s2(a)(6), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003). Although the Act allows
the agency to unblock the information under certain circumstances, the agency must notify
the consumer that it is doing so. Id. § 1681c-2(c)(2), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 152, 117
Stat. 1964 (2003).
203
Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154, 117 Stat. 1952
(2003). The Act as revised by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003), also requires a furnisher to put in place reasonable
procedures to respond to any notice that it receives from a consumer reporting agency that
a consumer has blocked identified information from the consumer’s report as resulting
from identity theft. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154 (2003).
204
See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
202
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able to compel the data aggregator and the data provider to correct the
mismatch, to get them to disconnect him from the discrediting act.
A misattribution may prevent the consumer from being able to fully
participate in the marketplace at a critical time in that consumer’s life.205
By the time the consumer learns of the error, not only has his reputation
been wrecked by the false information, the attribution of that
information to him has hampered his ability to live his life forward
based on his past. By delaying its meaningful accuracy test, the Act
allows agencies and furnishers a free pass that can be painfully costly to
the defamed consumer.
Such weak protections from mismatched information might have
been appropriate in 1970 when the FCRA was first enacted.206 At that
time, many records would have been on paper and reported on tape.
Though computerization did motivate Congress to enact the legislation,
data technology was still in its infancy and the Internet was largely just a
gleam in the eyes of a few dreamers.207 A free bite of the apple of
inaccuracy may have been justified then, as so many errors could only
have been caught through the painstaking process of human visual
inspection.
Courts, however, continue to interpret the Act as if the records were
arduously searched by hand, rather than easily by machine, and construe
the already mild obligation of agencies to use “‘reasonable procedures to
assure maximum possible accuracy’” before initially reporting a negative
item in a consumer’s name in ways that wholly fail to promote
identification accuracy.208 Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 209 and Sarver v.
Experian Information Solutions,210 both from the Seventh Circuit, exemplify
the stale application of analog standards of recklessness. In Crabill, the
defendant, a national consumer reporting agency, repeatedly
misattributed to the plaintiff information about transactions belonging to

205
See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86. One study found, for example, that such
exclusions from commerce are particularly likely to happen during period of heavy
volume, such as when interest rates provoke a rash of refinancings. Id.
206
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2413(a)(2), 110
Stat. 3009 (1996). Standards for furnishers were not imposed until 1996. Id.
207
See The Internet: A Short History of Getting Connected, www.fcc.gov/omd/history/
intenet/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
208
Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004); Crabill v. Trans
Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2001).
209
259 F.3d at 663.
210
390 F.3d at 972.
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the plaintiff’s brother.211 The agency did so even though the brothers
had different first names (John versus Jerry) and different social security
numbers.212 Their dates of birth, a piece of data that individuals do not
often mistake, were thirteen months apart.213 Given this knowledge, the
agency’s attribution of both sets of records to the plaintiff not only
overlooked the possibility of harm, but rashly ignored it. In the parlance
of this Article, the agency used fuzzy matching.214
Nonetheless, Judge Posner, writing for the unanimous panel,
excused the misattribution, noting that not only did the first names begin
with the same letter, but that the brothers’ social security numbers
differed by just one number.215 The court agreed with the agency that
someone could have mistranscribed the names and number, which could
lead to the possibility that the transactions involved could in fact have
been incurred by either brother.216 This possibility, according to the
court, justified the mismatching.217 Although the court acknowledged
that Trans Union could have programmed its computer differently to
match less loosely, it condoned the oversized net Trans Union used to
pull the plaintiff’s information from its databases, finding that the
agency could reasonably report the transactions of both brothers as those
of each one individually.218
The Crabill decision permits data aggregators a level of imprecision
that conflicts with day-to-day experience in the modern digital world, as
opposed to the old analog one. Most of us are accustomed to making
exacting matches between strings of characters. We expect that if we
miss one digit of a PIN, transpose two characters of a password, or skip
one numeral in an account number, access will be denied. Instead of
requiring that level of exactitude that is routine in our digital, characterstring-driven world, the Crabill court essentially allowed the defendant
to play by 1970 capability rules. As a result, each brother was denied the
right to be judged by his own biography and, instead, must submit to
being judged based on deeds done by another. The plaintiff lost control
over the image of his personality presented to others.
259 F.3d at 663.
Id.
213
Supplemental Brief of Appellee at *2, Crabill v. Trans Union Corp., No. 00-2078, 2001
WL 34105114 (7th Cir. June 18, 2001).
214
See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
215
Crabill, 259 F.3d at 663.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. The court affirmed summary judgment for the agency on the plaintiff’s FCRA
claim. Id. at 667.
211
212
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The Crabill court was persuaded by the aggregator’s justification for
fuzzy matching, that it increases accuracy by scooping up records
actually attributable to the targeted individual, but that fail to precisely
match the individual’s identity markers because someone—the original
recorder or the individual—mistranscribed one or more markers.
However, aggregators that employ fuzzy matching for that reason could
come even closer to their goal of a full and accurate portrayal of the
person by cross-checking that pool of records against known matches, a
task that would have been a great burden in the early days of the Act,
but which would likely take nothing but a tweak of the existing
algorithms and nanoseconds of computer time now. By overlooking all
the benefits of modern data technology that allowed the agency to traffic
in the mismatched records, the court failed to accord the benefits of that
technology to the misportrayed consumer.
Cross-checking can also prevent misattribution by undermatching,
where a record with identifying information insufficient to pinpoint it to
a specific individual is tagged to the wrong person. An aggregator can
compare the record with other information more closely matched to the
individual, which can reveal an inconsistency that the aggregator should
resolve before reporting any, especially negative, information. For
example, a record of an account opened in 1965 should not be matched
to an individual not born until four years later, regardless of the
similarity between the names.219 But internal inconsistencies can be
more subtle. For instance, if an aggregator has a bankruptcy filing
record with one person’s name, the aggregator could check additional
matching data before attributing it to the identity of a person who has
the same name, but whose other records show minimal debt.220 A report
that differs substantially from one issued the previous month,221 or is
derogatory when previously the subject had an “excellent business and
social reputation,”222 should raise the need for additional verification.223
One should be accountable for what one already knows and not hurt
someone’s reputation by disregarding that knowledge.

219
Sheffer v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 02-7407, 2003 WL 21710573, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
July 24, 2003).
220
Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court ruled that
reporting such a record notwithstanding this sort of inconsistency could be unreasonable.
Id. at 51-52 (interpreting the FCRA).
221
Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1982).
222
Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 88 (Ct. App. 1975) (upholding jury’s
finding that agency acted with malice).
223
Id.
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Notwithstanding the advances in data technology, courts have
generally held that agencies need not review a report for such
inconsistencies before issuing it. For example, in Sarver v. Experian
Information Solutions, another Seventh Circuit opinion, the court rejected
the claim of an individual to whom the agency had wrongly attributed
the bankruptcy of another.224 The court approved of an agency’s
mismatch of accounts that referred to a bankruptcy filing to the plaintiff,
even though only those accounts, and no others associated with that
plaintiff, were listed as having been “involved in bankruptcy.”225
Furthermore, the agency had not received any information of a
bankruptcy judgment in the plaintiff’s name.226
The plaintiff argued that given that only one set of accounts was
involved in bankruptcy, in contrast to the many healthy accounts
attributed to the plaintiff, the inconsistency should have alerted the
agency to its attribution error, but the court disagreed.227 In justifying
the agency’s failure to resolve the anomalies within the records
attributed to the plaintiff, the court emphasized the 200 million names
and addresses, the 2.6 billion trade lines, and the complexity of the
system.228 This reasoning overlooks that the very complexity of the
system reveals the ability of the agency to control the high volume of
individuals and records, and that ability should alert the agency to the
high risk of misattributing information. The court ruled that the
agency’s failure to investigate the inconsistency was not unreasonable
because the agency had no notice that the specific lender who had
provided information about the impaired accounts was unreliable.229
However, the question, in order to protect individuals from reckless
attribution, should not be whether any single provider is unreliable. The
question should have been whether reporting it as the plaintiff’s without
checking it, given the obvious inconsistency, was reckless. Where the
agency was aware of the risk of misattribution from fuzzy matching, and
that matching produced a record that was unlike the others, a jury
should decide whether the failure to take any steps to verify the
anomalous data breached the FCRA’s accuracy standard.
The Sarver court also reasoned that to require an agency to further
investigate the accuracy of a consumer’s records when an anomaly
224
225
226
227
228
229
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appeared would impose “enormous” increased costs.230 However, the
court did not refer to any estimate of the costs or explain why an already
complex system capable of making many comparisons among different
records could not inexpensively adjust to cross-checking data when
reliability was at issue. Furthermore, when an anomaly appears that
would work to the consumer’s detriment, an agency could simply
decline to attribute the negative data should it not want to take the extra
effort of verifying it. The decision allows the agency all of the benefits of
its database technology with none of the responsibilities.
Similar to the court’s disregard of the sort of precise matching
expected in most non-face-to-face transactions today, this reasoning is
out of date. The Crabill court should have understood that if the agency
is able to “process[ ] over 50 million updates to trade information each
day,”231 it has the capability to analyze data and to do so quickly. The
high-volume excuse may have been appropriate in an analog world,
where the agencies relied on physical pieces of information that required
a human being, rather than a computer, to read and understand them.
Human beings read slowly, compared with computers, and make
mistakes. However, the justification is no longer appropriate where a
computer can quickly compare individual records for consistency. The
Sarver court’s construction ignores that the very technological tools that
allow an agency to assemble a list of events for any one consumer can be
tightened to cross-check for just such a discrepancy. The speed, storage
capacities, and analytical capabilities of modern data processing systems
rob a great deal of the wonder from the process. As mentioned above,
Experian advertises that it maintains more than 65 terabytes—65 trillion
bytes—of data on North American consumers and business.232 The very
fact that the agency is capable of those kinds of numbers shows the
power it has over its data, as do the products the agencies market.233 If
the agency can harness that power for the benefit of data users, it should
be able to direct it to the benefit of those individuals whose events give
rise to the agency’s income.
Not only do these decisions fail to recognize the aggregators’
capacity to control data, they fail to reflect an understanding of the
power of a bad biography in a modern, data-driven world. The stamina,
accessibility, and duplicatability of all data and, for purposes of this
Id.
Id.
232
Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2007).
233
See supra text accompanying notes 47-58.
230
231
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discussion, bad data, give it much more power over the persons to
whom it pertains than when such data was more functionally obscure.234
To return to our fictional individual, once the calumny to Charlie
Consumer is digitized, it is almost irreversible. Other aggregators will
pick it up, store it, and report it. Users who would once not have sought
such detailed information now will request reports and store the false
information in Charlie’s name. When challenged, the provider and
aggregator may insist on attributing Charley’s misdeeds to Charlie, and
courts may hold that they can do so without violating the federal act
intended to cleanse this sort of gossip out of the information sea. The
original consumer’s reputation, built as it is from a false image, will
suffer among a much wider audience.
This power to cripple consumers’ abilities to participate in standard
life activities justifies a much higher standard of accuracy, not a lower
one. This higher standard should arise at the initial reporting of negative
information. Given the potential that a mismatched record has to
disrupt someone’s life, data providers and aggregators should ensure
that a “digital dossier” contains only those events in which that
individual actually participated.
B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Protection of Mismatchers
The FCRA is an unsatisfactory means for consumers to protect
themselves from defamation not just because it imposes weak standards
that several court decisions have further enfeebled. Even where a data
provider or aggregator fails to meet the Act’s standards, the Act protects
them from the consequences in three ways: by prohibiting private suits
for many infractions, by immunizing those in the consumer data
industry from most state claims, and by preempting state laws that
would require greater accuracy and accountability.235
However,
allowing those in the consumer data industry to traffic in information
without fearing liability diminishes accuracy and may discourage data
providers and aggregators from finding and using the sort of technology
that would scrub misidentified events from the databases. Although
some of these protections may have been justified in the nascent world of
computerized records when Congress first enacted the Act, the last two
major revisions to the Act have extended protections to private-sector
aggregators even though technology justifies increasing liability instead.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (providing qualified immunity); id. § 1681s-2(c) (eliminating
private causes of action for designated violations); id. § 1681t(b) (preempting designated
state laws).

234
235
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Limits on Private Suits

The aggregators garner, aggregate, and regurgitate information
provided to them by their providers, the businesses that record their
transactions with individuals.
Thus, these providers’ errors in
furnishing data on a consumer will lead directly to inaccurate
information disseminated by the agency. However, the rights that these
FCRA provisions give with one hand they take away with another. The
Act specifically provides that its civil claim sections236 may not be used to
enforce the obligation of providers to withhold information that they
“know[ ] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe” is inaccurate, regardless
of how egregiously a provider violates the provision.237 Only designated
federal agencies and state officials may enforce these rights.238
Accordingly, without the sort of determined agency action that has not
yet been forthcoming, the Act will do little to motivate data providers
from taking care to match records of events with their doers.
Now, the Act allows consumers to enforce one accuracy provision
against those data providers who attribute an event to the wrong
consumer.239 This provision, arising only after the provider has already
Id. §§ 1681n-o (titled civil liability for willful noncompliance and civil liability for
negligent noncompliance, respectively). The FCRA allows punitive damages if an actor
“willfully” violates its responsibilities under the Act. Id. § 1681n(a). To show willful
noncompliance, a plaintiff must show that a defendant “knowingly and intentionally
committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others, but need not show malice
or evil motive.” Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Sapia v. Regency Motors, 276 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 2002);
Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 12 Fed. Appx. 44, 50 (2d Cir. June 14, 2001);
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1997); Philbin v. Trans Union
Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 970 (3d Cir. 1996); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022 (1987); Yohay v. City of Alexandria Employees Credit
Union, Inc., 827 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987); Hurocy v. Direct Merch. Credit Card Bank,
N.A., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (denying summary judgment for
defendant, which plaintiff alleged had furnished inaccurate information about the plaintiff
to credit reporting agencies).
237
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(a), (c)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003).
238
Id. § 1681s-2(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003). Courts have
upheld this immunity. See, e.g., Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057,
1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of claim). But see Geeslin v. Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp., No. 1:97CV186-DA, 1998 WL 433932, at *5 (N.D. Miss. June 3, 1988)
(denying provider’s motion to dismiss § 1681s-2(a) claims against it with no reference to
the explicit statutory provision).
239
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1); see also Nelson, 282 F.3d at 1059-60 (reversing dismissal of
consumer’s action); Scott v. Amex/Centurion S&T, No. 3:01-CV-1594-H, 2001 WL 1645362,
at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2001) (accepting magistrate’s conclusion of law that consumer’s
complaint be dismissed with prejudice); Thomasson v. Bank One, La., N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d
721, 723 (E.D. La. 2001) (denying provider’s motion to dismiss); Mandly v. Bank One
236
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misattributed an event to an individual, requires furnishers who have
received a notice from a consumer reporting agency that a consumer has
disputed the completeness or accuracy of consumer data, to investigate
the dispute and modify, block, or delete the information if the furnisher
cannot verify its accuracy.240 However, furnishers only become subject
to that provision after the aggregator has already attributed the bad data
to the individual and reported the attribution to a third party. By that
point, the consumer has lost dignity and his rightful reputation. That is,
the bad data has already been put into the sea of information, from
where, given the duplicatability of electronic records, it may be
impossible for the consumer to retrieve and remediate it.
2.

Preemption of State Laws

The FCRA fails to protect individuals’ reputations by allowing
providers and aggregators to misattribute information and immunizing
them from state action except where a plaintiff can show malice. In
addition, it further exposes people to a high risk of digital defamation by
preempting many state laws that would otherwise provide an avenue of
recourse to those who suffered from an unearned reputation tainted by
the deeds of another.
By its express language, the general preemption rule under the Act
provides that the Act does not preempt state law claims.241 However, in
Dayton, No. 99-1358-PHX-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16269, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2000)
(same); McMillan v. Experian Info. Servs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D. Conn. 2000);
Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Ryan v. Trans
Union Corp., No. 99-C-216, 2000 WL 110040, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2000); Whitesides v.
Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 807, 812-13 (W.D. La. 2000) (denying
provider’s motion for summary judgment); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 991699(DWF/AJB), 2000 WL 33956225, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2000); Thompson v. Elec.
Transaction Corp., No. 1:98CV305-P-B, 2000 WL 33907674, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000);
Olexy v. Interstate Assurance Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047-48 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Bruce v.
First U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (denying, in part,
provider’s motion to dismiss); DiMezza v. First USA Bank, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301
(D.N.M. 2000) (same); Campbell v. Baldwin, 90 F. Supp. 2d 754, 756 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(denying motion to dismiss); Brown v. Maine Med. Ctr., No. 98-444-P-C, 1999 WL
33117137, at *3 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 1999) (magistrate’s recommendation to deny motion to
dismiss). But see Carney v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (W.D.
Tenn. 1999) (holding no private cause of action to enforce data provider’s reinvestigation
responsibilities, using an implausible construction of the provision).
240
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1954 (2003).
241
Id. § 1681t(a) (Supp. III 2003). Section 1681t(a) provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, this
subchapter does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject
to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of
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an example of the exceptions swallowing the rule, the FCRA lists several
specific preemption provisions that override any state “requirement or
prohibition” bearing a designated degree of similarity to the federal
provision, regardless of whether the state law is inconsistent or provides
the consumer greater protection.242 For example, the Act preempts all
state requirements or prohibitions relating to the subject matter of all of
the responsibilities of data providers to furnish accurate information and
to reinvestigate information contested as inaccurate.243
As discussed above,244 the one type of misattribution that Congress
directly addressed is that arising from identity theft.245 However,
Congress specifically preempted state laws that address the same
conduct as the identity theft provisions of the Act.246 Thus, the Act
drastically limits the ability of states to control how data aggregators and
their clients must respond to identity theft.247
3.

Qualified Immunity from State Common Law Torts

The right to redress for someone’s false report of an act has
traditionally been in tort, the province of state law. Not only does the
FCRA and interpreting case law drain its own effectiveness by voiding
many private actions against data providers, it also seeks to sweep away
state common law causes of action that protect the dignity and integrity
of individuals’ reputations. The FCRA limits certain state common law
any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any
information on consumers, or for the prevention or mitigation of
identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with
any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency.
Id. The exceptions in subsections (b) and (c) are discussed below, infra notes 242-46.
242
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (Supp. III 2003). Prior to the 2003 revisions to the Act, the thenexisting preemption provisions were due to expire on January 1, 2004, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(d)
(2000), and it was that pending expiration that motivated Congress to act not only to
enshrine the provisions but greatly expand them. Id.; see also Hendricks, supra note 39, at
337-65 (describing the intense lobbying efforts of the financial services industry).
243
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003). However, the Act
preserves actions brought pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 54A(a); and CAL. CIVIL
CODE § 1785.25(a), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting
Reform Act of 1996. Id.
244
See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
245
See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
246
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(B)-(C), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 711, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
247
Id. § 1681t(b)(5). Among the new duties of agencies that are related to identity theft
and that are now preempted are those in sections 1681c-1 (identity theft prevention; fraud
alerts and active duty alerts) and 1681c-2 (block of information resulting from identity
theft). Id.
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tort actions by victims of false reports, immunizing data aggregators,
users, and providers from any action “in the nature of defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence” based on information disclosed
pursuant to the Act,248 unless the plaintiff proves that the “false
information [was] furnished with malice or willful intent to injure” the
plaintiff.249
Congress imposed this limitation as a quid pro quo for the Act’s
requirements that agencies disclose to consumers the information that
they reported on them.250 Thus, the qualified immunity provision
should not completely shield data providers and aggregators from the
designated causes of action. It merely raises the level of proof required
of a consumer who brings a defamation, privacy, or negligence action
against an agency or a furnisher. Consumers will be more likely to be
able to show “malice”251 than “willful intent to injure.”252 So, what does
“malice” mean for purposes of the Act? Courts have largely adopted the
same standard issued by the Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan, which held that the First Amendment requires a public figure in
a defamation action to show that the publisher of a false story published
248

Id. § 1681h(e) (2000). The provision in its entirety states as follows:
(e) Limitation of liability
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no
consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant
to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information
disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against
whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on
the report except as to false information furnished with malice or
willful intent to injure such consumer.

Id.
Id. The qualified immunity provided by the Act applies only if the consumer
discovered the information through a disclosure mandated by the Act. Id.
250
See Hearings on S. 823 Before Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the Senate Banking & Currency
Comm., 91st Cong. 71 (1969). Senator Proxmire, the bill’s primary sponsor, originally
intended to preserve traditional state law remedies for false information. Id. at 24.
However, to assuage industry concerns that the Act’s required disclosures would release a
barrage of lawsuits against agencies and their furnishers—a fear that perhaps reflected the
unease of the industry with the accuracy of its data—Senator Proxmire proposed the
limited immunity. Id. at 104. Consumer advocates strenuously opposed this bargain. See
also Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1980); Yeager v. TRW, Inc., 984 F.
Supp. 517, 522 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (noting bargain); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F.
Supp. 577, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
251
See infra Part IV.A.
252
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
249
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false information with the knowledge that the information is false or
with reckless disregard of its truthfulness.253
To prove reckless
disregard, some have stated that the plaintiff must show that the speaker
“entertained actual doubt” about the truthfulness of the statement.254
As further discussed below, the power of disconnected data on
individuals and the capabilities of information technology are such that
much misattribution of data arises from just such “reckless disregard” of
the truth.255 That courts have adopted this standard for purposes of the
FCRA’s qualified immunity provision does not indicate that the standard
is required by the Constitution; the Supreme Court made that clear in
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,256 where it held that
mere negligence sufficed to impose liability on a consumer reporting
agency that published false information.257
In short, while appearing to protect consumers, the Act protects
those who tarnish consumers’ reputations by attributing the acts of
another to the consumer. The Act denies those individuals the ability to
enforce many of the Act’s own accuracy provisions, while at the same
time providing qualified immunity from state causes of action that might
arise from the agency’s mishandling. Simultaneously, the Act wholly
bars states from protecting their citizens from much of the damage bad
data can do, explicitly claiming a monopoly on much of the territory.
The showy substance of the 2003 amendments, which emphasize
furnisher responsibility and the consequences of identity theft, may have
distracted us from the impotent enforcement powers and the preemption
253
376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). Cases applying this standard include Cousin v. Trans Union
Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 376 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating judgment for the plaintiff); Rhodes v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 951 F.2d 905, 906-07 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting creditor’s motion for
summary judgment where creditor was merely negligent in falsely reporting that borrower
had defaulted on her car loan payments); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 705 (8th
Cir. 1980) (citing standard as “an example of a type of malice necessary to overcome a
qualified privilege”); Gordon v. Greenpoint Credit, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (S.D. Iowa
2003); Bruce v. First U.S.A. Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Yeager v.
TRW Inc., 984 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 213,
223 (D.D.C. 1993); Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 819 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Idaho 1991).
254
See, e.g., Bruce, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (granting summary judgment to furnisher who
had reported a fraudulent account as belonging to the plaintiff); Wiggins, 848 F. Supp. at
223.
255
Bruce, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
256
472 U.S. 749 (1985).
257
Id. at 795. The FCRA’s qualified immunity provision did not raise the plaintiff’s level
of proof because the plaintiff was a commercial enterprise, and accordingly the Act did not
apply to the defendant’s report. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(c)-(d) (Supp. III 2003) (defining a
consumer report as pertaining to a consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance,
employment, and other designated transactions defining a consumer as an individual).
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of state laws. Nonetheless, some arenas of traditional relief may still
exist, as discussed below.
IV. REVIVING THE COMMON LAW TORT OF DEFAMATION TO PROTECT
INDIVIDUALS’ REPUTATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND DIGNITY
When the aggregator- and provider-friendly interpretations of the
FCRA’s accuracy provisions are paired with the qualified immunity
provisions and state law preemption provisions, arguably the Act
becomes not a consumer protection act, but rather a data provider and
data aggregator protection act. Individuals cannot depend upon the Act
to protect their reputations, even though the power of data aggregators
to assemble data about (or purportedly about) consumers has swelled,
and that data has more power over individuals’ lives than ever. State
tort law, then, could be a viable alternative. After all, historically, tort
law has been the source of remedies for damage done by bad
information.258 Furthermore, defamation, a word that derives from a
Latin phrase meaning to spread rumor by false report, far more closely
identifies the injury misattribution does to a person’s dignity and
reputation than does the sterile-sounding “Fair Credit Reporting Act.”
The two torts designed to protect reputation are defamation and the
privacy tort of false light. Defamation is a communication that “tends so
to harm the reputation of another as to lower [that person] in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with [that person].”259 The tort of false light, one of the four
privacy torts classified by Dean Prosser,260 provides redress against one
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light, if that false light would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and the publisher either knew that the
matter was false or acted in reckless disregard as to the matter’s falsity.261
These torts are the historical avenues of redress for those whose
reputations are poisoned by those who misattribute transactions
mismatched to individuals. In contrast to the FCRA, they do not offer a
free pass to the misattributors. However, as discussed above, the FCRA

258
See Sheffer v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 02-7407, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12728,
at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2003) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on credit
defamation claim). A false statement in a credit report can be defamatory if it tends to
deter others from dealing with the plaintiff. Id.
259
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
260
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
261
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
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tries to deter defamed individuals from availing themselves of these torts
by offering data aggregators and data providers qualified immunity
from them, and overly-expansive readings of that protection has led to
the “frothy Chaos” of rumor and gossip clogging databases now.
However, an appropriate reading of the qualified immunity provision,
one that comports with modern access to and use of technology, could
make these torts meaningful tools with which to clean up corrupted data
and motivate actors to verify the information that they put into the data
sea.
Traditionally, false light has protected a person’s right to be let
alone, while defamation has protected people’s interests in their
reputations.262 But defamation protects not just the reputation of a
person, but also the right to dignity by protecting one’s interest in being
included within the portion of society that is worthy of respect.263
Falsely connecting the act of one to the identity of another not only
injures the reputation of the one stuck with the act, it violates that
person’s personhood and injures that person’s dignity.264 A flawed
digital image that includes the events not wholly of one’s making inflicts
the sort of damage to dignity that defamation law seeks to protect.265
That injury occurs even if the misattributed information is not
derogatory. Defamation protects “the manner in which the image of the
self is constructed in the social realm.”266
Though the FCRA federalized the law governing credit reports,
states continue to have a strong interest in protecting the reputation and
dignity of their citizens through common law torts such as defamation, a
principle repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court. In Gertz v. Welch,
the Court underscored “the compensation of individuals for the harm
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood” as a “legitimate state
interest.”267 Given that interest, the Court “would not lightly require the
State to abandon this purpose.”268 The decision quoted the following
words of Justice Stewart:

262
263
264
265
266
267
268

PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 864 (W. Page Keeton, ed., 5th ed. 1984).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 155-63.
Heyman, supra note 16, at 1339.
Id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
Id.
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[T]he individual’s right to the protection of his own
good name “reflects no more than our basic concept of
the essential dignity and worth of every human being—
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty. The protection of private personality, like the
protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual
States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But
this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less
recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional
system.”269
Notwithstanding the relevance of both torts, defamation is focused
on here because, as a general rule, the tort of false light publicity will not
help an individual who has suffered from misattributed information
because disclosures among those involved in a financial or personal
transaction will generally not meet the tort’s publicity element.270
Furthermore, not every state recognizes a cause of action for false light
invasion of privacy—in part because of its very overlap with the tort of
defamation.271 Even under the tort of defamation, however, a defamed
consumer must still contend with a common law qualified privilege that
benefits those who report financial information of others. Once that is
done, however, defamation can impose liability for the initial wrongful
reporting of information, which can help motivate the data industry to
prevent mismatched information from entering the flow of transmittable
data.

Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. The Restatement defines “publicity”
as meaning “that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or
to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one
of public knowledge.” Id.; see, e.g., Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204, 1206-07
(10th Cir. 1985) (disclosure of plaintiffs’ inaccurate credit report to subscribers did not meet
element). However, as electronically-stored information grows increasingly accessible,
victims of misattribution may be able to meet this element. Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206-07.
271
See, e.g., Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989),
abrogated in part on other grounds by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20
(Mass. 1990); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); Sullivan v.
Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Howell v. New York Post,
Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d
405, 413 (N.C. 1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669-670 (Ohio 1983); Brown
v. Pearson, 483 S.E.2d 477, 484 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577,
579-80 (Tex. 1994); Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis. 1989).
269
270
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A. Defamation’s Qualified Privilege and the Existing Construction of Malice
1.

The Development of the Privilege, Its Mixed Acceptance, and Its
Incorporation into the Fair Credit Reporting Act

Defamation was once a viable tool for those defamed by the earliest
forms of data aggregators in the modern age—credit agencies.
Nonetheless, those agencies were not strictly liable for false information,
nor were they usually even liable for negligence. Rather, the common
law allowed them a qualified privilege of malice.272 In this way, the
FCRA did not, at least with respect to this one tort, change the common
law dramatically by offering aggregators, providers, and users qualified
immunity from defamation.273 Courts developed the privilege to protect
those merchants who did a credit business and who needed to know
who in their community paid promptly. To protect this need to share
information, communications on the subject are privileged if made in
good faith. Therefore, in those states that recognize the privilege, a party
whose reputation is injured by such a communication must prove actual
malice.274 Eventually commercial agencies took over the business of
aggregating credit information and the privilege followed them.275
However, not every jurisdiction hands this shield to credit reporting
agencies. Some prefer to protect the reputations of individuals from
false information. In a decision that assigned decidedly more weight to
the dignity of individuals than to creditors’ interests in the information,
one court characterized the interests as follows in rejecting a privilege to
defame:
If, therefore, it be immoral to spy and pry into the habits
and business of another, and to make false statements
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882, 883-86 (8th Cir. 1965);
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1947); Moore v. Beneficial
Nat’l Bank USA, 876 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Robinson, 345 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Ark. 1961); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct.
App. 1975); Lomas Bank USA v. Flatow, 880 S.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); see also
Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1361-61 (1975) (describing the
development of qualified privileges).
273
See supra text accompanying notes 257-70.
274
See, e.g., McDowell v. Credit Bureaus of Southeast Mo., Inc., 747 S.W.2d 630, 631-32
(Mo. 1998) (agency that had falsely reported that plaintiffs, operators of a home
construction business, had filed for bankruptcy were entitled to qualified privilege in libel
action brought against it). California has codified the common law privilege at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 47(c)(3).
275
HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 177-79.
272
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about his character and business respectability, it is also
illegal by our statute law. If one makes it his business to
pry into the affairs of another in order to coin money for
his investigations and information, he must see to it that
he communicate nothing that is false. The falsehood of
the communication, in print or in writing, maligning in
effect the private character and mercantile standing, is
itself evidence of malice, legal malice; and unless it be
strictly a privileged communication in the performance
of a public duty, or a private duty, moral or legal, and
then bona fide and not “as a cloak for private malice” the
right of action and redress by damages are the remedies
of the injured.276
Another court rejected the privilege not on the basis of morality, but
on more practical grounds. In Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the
defendant, a credit reporting agency, had misattributed two lawsuits
that had been filed against a “David Hood” to the plaintiff, who had the
same name.277 The Fifth Circuit, interpreting Georgia law, rejected the
agency’s assertion of privilege, relying in part on an empirical study that
found no difference in the credit availability in a jurisdiction denying the
privilege to one that did.278
Florida once recognized such a privilege, but one state court of
appeals decided to abolish it.279 Idaho has also refused to recognize such
276
Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172, 175 (1886) (internal citation omitted). The
Georgia Supreme Court later emphatically rejected an opportunity to adopt a qualified
privilege for credit reporting agencies:
We cannot agree to this weighting of the scales against the individual
who stands alone facing a commercial Goliath with the power to
destroy-not necessarily through malice but perhaps merely from
carelessness-his credit rating, commercial advantages, insurance
protection and employment, all through the publication of erroneous
reports concerning his affairs.
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 770, 218 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1975).
277
486 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1973). The court rejected the agency’s argument that credit
reports are of general and public interest, stating that “Irresistible logic and the absence of
empirical verification compel this court to conclude that the privilege should not be blindly
applied to credit reporting agencies in this case.” Id. at 32.
278
Id.
279
Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 259 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). That
court reasoned as follows:
Times change and principles of law change with them. “A man’s
credit in this day and age is one of his most valuable assets and
without it, a substantial portion of the American people would be
without their homes, washing machines, refrigerators, automobiles,
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a privilege, understanding the natural consequences it would have: “If a
mercantile agency can safely make false reports about the financial
standing and credit of the citizen and destroy his business, it can then
take the next step with equal impunity and destroy his reputation,
leaving him shorn and helpless.”280 A Massachusetts decision reasoned
that a reasonable limit on the privilege is justified because “There is no
social utility in reports that are made recklessly or without reasonable
grounds. The injury to the subject of the report can be great and the
person receiving the report gains nothing.”281
While these decisions make strong policy arguments against such a
privilege, as discussed above, Congress incorporated the privilege into
the FCRA.282 Accordingly, if the damage done to an individual’s
reputation and dignity arises from a report that falls within the FCRA,
the Act will require the individual to show malice or willful intent in
order to pursue a cause of action for defamation, even if state law would
not accord such latitude to the aggregator.283 In fact, even where the
Act’s qualified immunity provision does not apply, the individual will
likely have to overcome the common law privilege accorded to
aggregators, which also generally requires a heightened standard of
misconduct.284
Malice, as used in the FCRA and in cases interpreting the qualified
privilege,285 does not mean moral malice, as in a desire to harm others.286
television sets, and other mechanical paraphernalia that are now
regarded as necessities of life.” The impersonal and unconcerned
attitude displayed by business machines as to the impact of their
actions upon an individual consumer as here reflected was the catalyst
for our National Congress to pass the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which
provides protection for consumers from irresponsible credit reporting
agencies.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
280
Pac. Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 139 P. 1007, 1010 (Idaho 1914); see also W. Union
Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 34 S.E. 216, 216-17 (Ga. 1899) (rejecting privilege,
distinguishing cooperative exchanges of information from mercantile agencies, who make
a pecuniary use of the information).
281
In re Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Mass. 1961) (holding that
mercantile agency lost privilege where it issued two inconsistent reports and where
significant derogatory information was “susceptible of precise check”).
282
See supra Parts III.B.1-B.2.
283
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000).
284
See supra Part III.B.3.
285
See supra text accompanying notes 251-70.
286
See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1965) (common
law privilege); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 345 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Ark. 1961) (common
law privilege); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85-87 (Ct. App. 1975)
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Rather, statutory and common law malice mean acting “with knowledge
that [the information] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.”287 Malice has also been defined as making a report
without reasonable grounds to do so.288 A few courts have even
constrained the definition of “reckless disregard” to require the plaintiff
to show that “‘the speaker entertained actual doubt about the truth of the
statement.’”289
2.

The Relationship Between the Standard of Malice and Data
Technology

The standard of malice should flex to reflect modern database
technology, data aggregators’ awareness of errors of misattribution, and
the power of information and misinformation over individuals.
Practices that may have failed to reach the standard before modern
information technology developed might well surpass the standard now.
That technology allows us to pull up and compare different pieces of
information as if they were books on a desk. The failure to examine
records over which one has complete control can meet the standard of
malice.290 It is, in fact, even easier to compare data in a database than to
find, for example, conflicting passages between two pieces of printed
text—the digital form of the information allows it to be pinpointed
immediately.
Doubt should arise where data providers are aware of a tendency to
undermatch their transactions to the individuals actually making them
or when aggregators are aware that the matching algorithms they use are
likely to mismatch some records to the wrong individuals, even if for
any single report the aggregator does not entertain doubt as to that
specific report. That doubt should arise from the knowledge of the rate
(common law privilege); Myshrall v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 802 A.2d 419, 424-25 (Me. 2002);
see also Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 418 (4th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting FCRA’s punitive damages provision, which requires the plaintiff to show the
actor acted willfully).
287
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
288
In re Petition of Retailers Comm. Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Mass. 1961)
(reversing judgment against agency on grounds that agency did not lose privilege through
mere negligence).
289
Moore v. Equifax Info. Servs. L.L.C., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 862 F. Supp.
824, 833 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan); Lomas Bank USA v. Flatow,
880 S.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
290
See Interstate Transit Lines v. Crane, 100 F.2d 857, 860-62 (10th Cir. 1938) (ruling that
employee overcame qualified privilege of employer by showing “indifference” to the
employee’s interests, and affirming judgment of libel against defendant).
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of inaccuracies and by the complaints made to data providers and
aggregators by defamed consumers.291 Furthermore, the rising risks of
identity theft—just one form of mismatching—have not been unnoticed
by the agencies or, for that matter, by Congress.292 At least one court has
identified the rise in identity theft as sufficient on its own to raise the
standard of care that aggregators should use and,293 as noted above, the
FTC received more than 240,000 complaints of identity theft in 2003.294
The awareness of that risk is particularly visible in the new products that
agencies and providers offer and the demand for those products.295 In
the old world of paper records, it would have been reckless for an
agency to report a negative item, such as a lawsuit, as being the
responsibility of a particular individual when an employee had, sitting
on his desk, identifying information that conflicted with that in the item.
These databases essentially put all of their information at the fingertips
of those who provide and aggregate it. Furthermore, these parties know
well the power of information; it is what supports the industry.
Accordingly, what might not have been reckless treatment of
information many years ago may well rise (or fall) to that standard in the
present day, given the ability of data aggregators and providers to
aggregate and analyze the data in their warehouses and the power that
data has over the lives of individuals.
Other torts adapt to fit advances in knowledge and technology;
defamation can as well. For example, a medical malpractice action can
arise from a doctor’s failure to use a current standard of care, including
advances in medical technology, rather than the standard of care
appropriate in past generations.296 Similarly, behavior that may not have
once arisen to reckless disregard of the truth can now meet that
standard.
See MISTAKES DO HAPPEN, supra note 62, at 4.
See, e.g., Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Balance Between Privacy and
Commercial and Governmental Use, Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Apr.
13, 2005).
293
Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., 306 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Minn. 2004); see supra text
accompanying notes 126, 184.
294
See supra note 73 (citing FTC Releases Top 10 Consumer Complaint Categories for 2004,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top102005.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007)).
295
See supra text accompanying notes 28-60.
296
See JOHN J. ELWELL, A MEDICO-LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, COMPRISING THE ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 54-56 (1860); see also John
C. Drapp III, Comment, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does
Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 100-01
(2003) (discussing evolution from “the strict locality standard” that was based on the
inability of rural physicians to keep up with advances in the profession, as technological
advances allowed physicians to learn of such advances).
291
292
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Modern Analog Interpretations of Malice

Although malice should not require intentional wrongdoing, some
decisions have deferred so far to aggregators and providers that they
have inadequately considered whether evidence of some lower level of
mishandling should lift the FCRA’s qualified immunity provision.
Interpreting “recklessness” to cover behavior such as ascribing an act to
an individual when the ascriber’s own data system has conflicting
information, publishing information from a source the publisher knows
to have been inaccurate previously, or failing to counter the fraud
running rampant in the consumer data industry does not expand the
original concept of appropriate liability, but rather enforces it.297 Courts
need to apply the recklessness standard in light of modern digital
technology, rather than of older, analog processes.
For example, a report should not logically include an account
opened before the target individual had even been born. In one case, the
defendant acknowledged that it used fuzzy matching to assemble credit
reports and did not check the accuracy on records whose identity
markers did not quite match the target’s.298 Had the defendant done so,
it would perhaps have realized before issuing the report that the record
of a bankruptcy by one company whose name was similar to the
plaintiff’s could not have been the plaintiff’s because the plaintiff’s
incorporation date, the institutional equivalent of a birth date, showed
that it did not exist at the time of the bankruptcy.299 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that the agency’s deliberate use of fuzzy matching was
not reckless and dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim.300 In fact, it
was not reckless; it was intentional.
Similarly, another court dismissed a defamation claim where a
consumer reporting agency had merged records belonging to the
plaintiff’s son and daughter-in-law into plaintiff’s credit report, even
though the records did not match the plaintiff’s social security number,
address, or date of birth, and even though the agency continued to
misattribute some of the son’s accounts to his father after the father
alerted the agency of the errors and provided the agency with his own

See, e.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973).
County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
299
Id. at 386.
300
Id. at 389.
297
298
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accurate identifying information.301 Another court found that a creditor
did not act recklessly in reporting a loan that the creditor had extended
to an identity thief as being the responsibility of one of the plaintiffs,
even though the identifying documents used by the thief conflicted in
several ways with the data in the plaintiff’s credit report, including the
date of birth and work history.302
These internal conflicts in information within an agency or
furnisher’s ownership should raise doubts as to accuracy before it is ever
attributed to any particular person. However, even should overlooking
a conflict fail to be reckless at that point, serious doubts as to accuracy
should arise once a consumer notifies an aggregator or a furnisher that a
debt reported in the consumer’s name is not his. Although a certain
percentage of such disputes may be weak attempts to avoid answering
for a legitimate debt, the risk that some disputes may be valid should
trigger in the reporting figure sufficient doubt to look for additional
indicia of accuracy. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit, in Morris v. Equifax
Information Services, L.L.C.,303 held that an agency did not act recklessly in
continuing to falsely report a debt as belonging to the plaintiff, even
though the plaintiff had notified the agency of his dispute and yet,
according to the plaintiff, the agency “continued to publish the same
false information about [the plaintiff] without lifting a finger to
determine whether the information was false or not.”304 According to
the court, the consumer’s notification did not “present ‘sufficient
evidence . . . that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of [its] publication.’”305 If serious doubts do not arise from the
conflicts within the agency’s or creditor’s own system or from a
consumer’s direct challenge to the information, then the malice standard
becomes nearly unattainable
One judge, who reluctantly allowed a claim to go forward,
questioned why a business would have been motivated to create false
accounts upon the application of an identity thief, accounts that the
business could expect would be difficult to collect.306 However, the

301
O’Connor v. Trans Union Corp., No. 97-4633, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14917, at **2-3,
**21-23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1999).
302
Aklagi v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1196 (D. Kan. 2002).
303
457 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment).
304
Id. at 471.
305
Id. (emphasis & citation omitted).
306
Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (continuing to
report accounts after learning of mismatching error could demonstrate the willfulness
necessary for punitive damages under the Act).
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court’s question reveals a number of misunderstandings about the role
of information in the digital world. First, the question should not be
whether the merchant intended to create a fraudulent account. The
plaintiff should not have to show, in order to claim defamation, that the
merchant intended, at the time it opened the account, to open it in the
name of someone who had not applied for it. For purposes of showing
malice, the question should be, when the merchant reported the
account’s delinquency to the data aggregators, whether that merchant
has serious doubts as to whether the identity of the person that the
business designated as responsible for the account actually is, in fact, the
person who had opened it. Such doubts could, and should, arise from
any mismatch between the identity markers in a credit report the
business sought at the time the account was opened, such as date of
birth, place of birth, or social security number, and those on the
application for service. Such doubts could also arise from past
experiences with misattribution, from internal fraud-prevention reviews
and procedures, or from other revelations of risk. Furthermore, surely
such doubts arise when the misidentified individual notifies the business
of its error and provides substantiating identifying information, such as
date of birth or address, that distinguishes that individual from the
account opener. Continuing to attribute the account to that individual
after such events should be considered reckless, thereby malicious, and
thus grounds for a defamation action.
Second, the statement ignores that the faulty account is just one in
thousands. While a business may not intend to open any one particular
account for an impostor, it may well not mind the risk of opening some
accounts without sufficiently verifying the applicant’s identity if the
business perceives the costs of absorbing those losses as reasonable in
light of other profits. One assessment of those losses includes the
relatively small chance that they will have to pay significant damages to
the person to whom they wrongly attributed the information. That
chance is artificially small because of the burden imposed on individuals
to demonstrate recklessness and because of the shield that the FCRA’s
dated interpretations of the Act’s accuracy and immunity provisions
grant them.
Finally, the judge’s statement above that a business would not be
motivated to create an account in the name of someone who did not
open it also assumes that someone who does not owe a debt will not pay
it, which overlooks the power of negative financial information in the
information age. Given the impact a delinquent account may have on an
individual and the relatively weak ability of individuals to clear falsely
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attributed data, a business may be able to count on strong-arming the
individual to pay the debt incurred by another, profiting off of the
consumer’s need to proceed with his or her transactional life.
The decision portrays a rigid conception of malice, a conception that
soldiers on, impervious to changes in technology, uses of that technology
by merchants and data aggregators, and the power of information.
Curtailing the standard this way allows aggregators all the benefit of
advancing technology with no responsibility to use it for the benefit of
the individuals on whom they report.
In contrast, where an aggregator’s employee, as opposed to its
machine, has records that clearly identify two separate people, reporting
one person’s record as the other can show reckless disregard for the
truth, clearing the Act’s qualified immunity malice hurdle.307 In Wiggins
v. Equifax Services, the plaintiff’s employer fired him after a background
check service reported that he had a felony conviction on his record. 308
The employer had provided the service with the plaintiff’s first name,
last name, middle initial, date of birth, social security number, and
address.309 The service’s employee located a felony conviction record of
someone with the same first and last names, but a different middle initial
and date of birth, and reported that conviction as the plaintiff’s.310 The
court refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation claim against the
service, finding that issuing a report before verifying the conviction
could meet the reckless disregard standard.311 Implicitly, the court
found fuzzy matching to be an unreasonable data aggregation technique,
at least where a human being observes a conflict between the identity
markers in the record and those of the target.
By viewing recklessness in light of computers’ abilities to
consistently and mechanistically compare data, the risk of liability for
defaming an individual would rise. That risk could, and hopefully
would, motivate data aggregators to use their information technology to
cleanse gossip and rumor from their systems.

307
308
309
310
311

See Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., 848 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D.D.C. 1993).
Id. at 217.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 223.
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Modern Digital Interpretations of the Malice Standard

Other courts have adjusted to the advances in technology, realizing
that both data providers and data aggregators should be well aware that
data may not belong to whom it appears. Failing to acknowledge that
risk, by verifying identities of doers of the deeds they report, surpasses
that standard of recklessness. One such decision, Graham v. CSC Credit
Services, Inc., illustrates the frustrations of a consumer in the digital age
who must cleanse his or her biographical record of someone else’s
deed.312 In Graham, the plaintiff learned when he applied for a mortgage
that an identity thief had opened an account with a creditor in the
plaintiff’s name and that the defendant, a consumer reporting agency,
had reported the thief’s account as being the plaintiff’s responsibility.313
The plaintiff disputed the ownership of the debt to the agency and also
notified the defendant that two addresses listed in the plaintiff’s report—
one of which the creditor had supplied—were wrong. Although the
agency did delete the two addresses, it insisted that the fraudulent
account was the plaintiff’s, having sent an automated dispute resolution
form to the data provider and supposedly receiving an automated
response that verified the account.314 The agency only deleted the
misattributed account when the plaintiff insisted on challenging it for a
second time.315
This sort of problem might be far rarer if agencies stored not just
new items of information, but the sources of that information. Recording
sources would reveal information about the item’s reliability and could
indicate identity theft. In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim that the agency
had not only violated the FCRA, but had done so willfully, the Graham
court castigated the agency for designing its database so as not to record
the source of data and emphasized that the substantive standard of
reasonableness under the Act moves with advances in technology.316
Agencies, the court stated, “have a duty to update their systems to
continue to strive for accuracy” in the face of “new dangers, such as
identity theft.”317 The court noted the FTC’s report that millions of

306 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Minn. 2004).
Id. at 876 n.1.
314
Id. The agency insisted that the creditor verified the debt electronically, but the
creditor disagreed, stating that it had a note in its files that the account might be
fraudulent. Id.
315
Id. at 877.
316
Id. at 883.
317
Id. at 881 n.1.
312
313
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Americans had been victims of identity theft in the recent past.318 Thus,
changes in technology and in information use “change the definition” of
what is reasonable.319 The court held that the agency’s “intentional
policy decision” to avoid structuring its system to lower the risk of
misattributed data could justify punitive damages under the FCRA.320
Other courts have also reasoned that to knowingly mismatch or
undermatch records can be reckless. For example, in McMillan v.
Experian, a furnisher reported the account of a son as being that of his
father, who had the same name, even after the father challenged it and
even though the two had different dates of birth, addresses, phone
numbers, and employment addresses.321 The court ruled that such
undermatching could show reckless disregard for the truth and denied
the furnisher’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
defamation claim.322 Similarly, in Stevenson v. Employers Mutual Ass’n, an
employee was suspended from his job after the defendant, who was
hired to do background checks, reported that he was a three-time
convicted felon after matching the convictions to another by the same
name.323 The court ruled that the defendant’s failure to check its match
by examining a physical description of the criminal or by comparing the
plaintiff’s work record to the criminal’s times of imprisonment could be
sufficiently reckless to pass the FCRA’s malice hurdle, and it denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s libel claim.324
Even if the original mismatching of a record to an individual is not
reckless, once the individual contacts an aggregator or provider about
the error, that aggregator’s next report of the record should meet the
recklessness standard and amount to malice.325 So, for example, if a
business opens an account upon an identity thief’s application, the
individual to whom the data provider attributes the debt should be able
to show malice if the provider continued to report the account in the
Id.
Id.
320
Id. at 881. That is, that the policy decision could constitute a willful violation of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2000). Some decisions equate willfulness with malice. See, e.g.,
Crane v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
321
170 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2001).
322
Id. at 287.
323
960 F. Supp. 141, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
324
Id.
325
See, e.g., Weir v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., 435 S.E.2d 864, 867 (S.C. 1993) (affirming trial
court’s denial of data provider’s motion for a directed verdict where plaintiff showed that
he had contacted the provider about the account several times yet the provider continued
to report the account as his, and stating that the jury could infer malice from such conduct).
318
319
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individual’s name, even after the individual has notified the provider of
the theft.326
Neither of the Seventh Circuit mismatching cases discussed earlier,
in relation to the FCRA’s standards, involved defamation claims, and
accordingly they did not analyze malice.327 However, had those
decisions used the interpretation advocated here, that aggregators are
reckless when they misattribute a transaction to an individual
notwithstanding that they have learned that their own databases clearly
reveal irresolvable inconsistencies, both plaintiffs would have been able
to recover for the damage done to their reputations. In Crabill, where the
agency wrongly attributed to the plaintiff information belonging to the
plaintiff’s brother, the attribution was reckless because the identifying
information of name, social security number, and date of birth of the two
brothers were in such clear conflict.328 Once the plaintiff notified the
agency of the error and specifically requested that the agency put “‘do
not confuse with brother John D. Crabill’” in every report, the agency’s
continued misattributions surpassed recklessness, arguably rising to
intentional.329 In Sarver, where the aggregator, a consumer reporting
agency, attributed accounts that indicated the borrower’s bankruptcy to
the wrong individual, the agency acted recklessly at the latest when it
repeated the misattribution, even after the plaintiff had notified the
agency of its error.330
In sum, many present day information practices are reckless, and
defamation liability likely should arise. The limitations on lawsuits for
the false imputation of one doer’s event to another should reflect the
realities of current or even recently obsolete information technology. As
discussed above, the problem of misattributing a particular event to the
wrong doer is a problem of mismatching identity. If we think of identity
as comprising a collection of Goffman’s identity pegs, the increase in the
volume of recorded transactions increases the risk that using just one
peg—for example a social security number—will mismatch the record to
the wrong person. When identity pegs are made fuzzy by identification
326
See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922-23 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(continuing to report accounts after learning of mismatching error could demonstrate the
willfulness necessary for punitive damages under the Act); Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc.,
848 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D.D.C. 1993) (where an employee of the agency knew that the target
of the report had a different middle name and date of birth from that on derogatory record,
malice requirement could be met, denying agency’s motion for summary judgment).
327
See supra text accompanying notes 208-33.
328
259 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2000).
329
Id.
330
390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004).
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algorithms that deliberately undermatch those pegs, the risk becomes
even higher. However, technology can help identify matching errors by
checking for anomalies and, when one arises, verifying additional
identity pegs to drop the risk of misattribution. Once aware of a risk of
misattribution, failing to use information over which one has complete
possession and control to maximize accuracy is every bit as reckless
under the malice standard as if the contradiction were apparent from the
face of two pieces of paper, as in Wiggins v. Equifax Services,331 instead of
from two different digital records.
An updated understanding of recklessness, for purposes of tort
liability, for mismatching of data could also expand the protections of the
FCRA. A practice that was reckless for purposes of defamation law
should fail the FCRA’s demand that data aggregators use “reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”332 and to reasonably
reinvestigate disputes,333 surely unreasonable for purposes of the FCRA.
Recognizing the culpability of the participants in the data market by
characterizing these practices as reckless is justified by several
circumstances. First, the problem of misattribution is well known to the
data market participants. The volume of consumers’ disputes to
agencies and of complaints to the FTC has given them notice of the flaws
in their data verification practices. Other justifying circumstances are
discussed below.
B. Reinterpretation Will Promote Dignity, Personhood, and Liberty
The computer age, the Internet, and the development of information
technology have provided people with immense power to impact the
social identity of individuals; such power should bring with it inherent
responsibility that has not yet been adopted or imposed. As discussed
above, by interpreting “recklessness” in light of the immense capacity of
modern data technology to analyze and verify data, the common law can
provide defamed consumers with an avenue for redress.
More
importantly, raising a specter of liability for initial false reports would
motivate data providers and aggregators to ensure the integrity of data
and reports, which would keep false information from falling into the
pool of data, from which it is so very hard, maybe impossible, to fully
and thoroughly retrieve it.

331
332
333

Wiggins, 848 F. Supp. at 223.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 184-85.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
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Right now, the FCRA and outdated interpretations of its qualified
immunity from defamation and of the common law’s own privilege have
allowed data providers, aggregators, and miners to benefit from the
technology that allows them to pull, cull, and analyze immense amounts
of data while at the same time receiving protection from interpretations
of law that overlook the mastery those aggregators have, or should have,
over the data they warehouse. This robs consumers of dignity and
personhood by presenting these distorted virtual images as themselves
and exposes them to a higher risk of being deemed financially unfit,
while maximizing the impact of false information.
Existing
interpretations effectively allow them to defame until forced to stop.
Primary protection of reputation, personality, and dignity require
preventing the injury to begin with. Tort law has always had the motive
of preventing injury, and defamation is the age-old tool to protect these
interests. In contrast, federal statutory law, like the FCRA, has not
traditionally protected personhood. As used and interpreted, it does not
prevent injury to personality or reputation, but provides a rather
haphazard system of remedies and non-remedies for those who have
been injured by the false attribution of a negative act.
Roscoe Pound argued that the right to one’s personality develops
logically from a Kantian formula of justice that is confirmed by showing
that in the evolution of society the right has been increasingly
recognized.334 The protection of personality passes the test of whether it
promotes “the general, the public, organization and order, . . . in such a
way as to equalize opportunity for all.”335
Defamation is the method by which society protects dignity, which
Robert Post characterizes as the “respect (and self-respect) that arises
from full membership in society.”336 The law of defamation enforces
“society’s interest[s] in its rules of civility.”337 Furthermore, in contrast to
the FCRA, where few decisions have found meaningful liability for the
initial report of false information, the common law of defamation can
impose liability for the original reporting of false information.
Defamation not only serves to protect dignity, it protects that aspect
of the right to personality that allows individuals control over how their
image is portrayed to the rest of the world. Our capacity to remain
334
335
336
337
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independent from external forces or stimuli is threatened by the
irresponsible use of detached data. With the loss of control, an
individual loses the ability to determine the image seen by others and the
reputation portrayed to others. Daniel Solove, in arguing for privacy
protections, argues that they are needed because “concerns about being
misjudged and having one’s reputations poisoned can make people
profoundly unfree, shackling them to their perceptions of how they will
be perceived.”338
That loss of control can, in turn, drive one to internalize the false
image.339 Steven Heyman argues that a person who is denied the right to
self-determination is denied liberty.340 As he notes, the right to
personality entitles one to determine “one’s own inner life without
wrongful interference” from others.341 False data interferes with this
right.342
While defamation and invasion of privacy torts such as false light
protect the damage to individuals, routine dissemination of bad data can
damage dignity in a systemic way, beyond the injury to an individual’s
“inviolate personality.”343 Lies do not contribute to the “democratic
dialogue,” but rather “distort[ ] the collective search for truth.”344 One
scholar has even insisted that defamation law “is as essential to the
health of the [country] and the press as it is to the victims of
338
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1040 (2003).
339
See Heyman, supra note 16.
Thus there is a certain unity between the self and its image, just as
there was between the self and the body in the sphere of external
rights. Moreover, the self asserts a claim to its image, for it is only
through this image that it is capable of interacting with others and thus
fully realizing itself. It follows that one has a right to one’s image,
including one’s reputation. This right has two elements. Negatively, it
consists in a right not to have actions or characteristics falsely imputed
to oneself. Positively, it is the right not to be deprived of the image
that one has legitimately acquired through interaction with others.
Id. at 1338.
340
Id. at 1314.
341
Id. at 1325. Heyman’s thesis is that the rights to self-determination and one’s
personality justifies certain limits on First Amendment freedoms that interfere with such
natural rights. Id. at 1279, 1333.
342
Id. at 1333-34. Heyman compares defamation to battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, in terms of the injuries inflicted. Id.
343
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1890) (arguing for a new tort to protect individuals’ privacy).
344
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 951 (1968).
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defamation.”345 Justice White, in his dissent from the majority opinion in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,346 argued that state libel laws arose to protect
the “essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty” and that such laws were
necessary for the continued existence of our political system.347 In order
to be able to achieve that protection, given data aggregation and the
“frothy Chaos” of errors,348 defamation and false light torts should be
interpreted consistently with the capabilities of those who create, report,
and distribute consumer information and with the power of such
information to harm individuals.
Furthermore, it is not just the defamed individual who suffers from
data pollution; those who rely on that data to make decisions also are
harmed. A polluted sea of data will lead to poor business decisions—for
example, an employer could lose out on a valuable and profitable
employee or a lender could lose out on a trustworthy borrower. If such
entities are suffering, then one might reasonably ask why do they not
assert their own claims against data aggregators. Perhaps it is because
the damage suffered when one deal is lost is slight compared to the total
numbers.
One criticism of common law is that it is too reactive and too gradual
in its change to effectively protect against the misuse of information
technology.349 A similar criticism of tort law is that it is intended to
remedy isolated, individual wrongs, as opposed to systemic problems.350
Such an approach is “reactive”351 and treated as a matter of individual
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1991).
418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). The majority held that “so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual.” Id. at 347.
347
Id. at 341. Justice White reasoned that while civilized society may justify some
exposure of individuals’ lives, those individuals do “not bargain for defamatory
falsehoods.” Id. at 402; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene
Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2000).
348
Montaigne, supra note 2.
349
Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J.
2029, 2033 (2001).
350
Solove, Enforcing Privacy Rights, supra note 37, at 1232-33. Solove notes the problem of
aggregation—how one individual piece of information may not in and of itself be
sensitively revealing, but when aggregated with many other such pieces can form what he
calls a “‘digital biography’” of a person that can form a whole that is greater than the sum
of the parts. Id. at 1233. Thus, with aggregation we have “the growing use and
dissemination of personal information creat[ing] a Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy . . . .”
Id. at 1234.
351
Id. at 1231.
345
346
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entitlement.352 However, providing individuals with even one effective
tool with which to repair damaged reputations could motivate those in
the consumer data industry to curb undermatching and fuzzy matching
of data. Just as the aggregation of different points of personal
information can be larger than the sum of the points, perhaps the
aggregation of individual torts can also have a systemic impact.
Law and economics arguments that privacy is inefficient because it
promotes fraud and hampers the exchange of information do not apply
where the information is false, and, in fact, privacy would help cleanse
the market of fraudulent information.353 Nonetheless, defamation law by
itself will not cure all the problems consumers have with others’ acts
stuck to their identities, a solution to what Lawrence Lessig calls “the
failure of the information market.”354
One concern is that rigid matching procedures would cause
aggregators to fail to link a doer’s deed to the doer, an inaccuracy of a
different sort. For example, requiring a name to match exactly might
exclude those records where an individual omitted a middle initial, or
where a clerk mistyped a social security number. However, the damage
done to individuals whose histories are blackened by another’s acts
should outweigh the smaller harm that the biography a user receives is
incomplete. The misery of repairing an inaccurate history extends across
months and costs victims time, money, and dignity.355
The importance of attributing events correctly has risen with the
increased use of credit scores. Users themselves may not access the
whole biography to make their own independent assessment of the
credibility of each record. The use of credit scores means that users—the
credit card companies, the mortgage lenders, the department stores—
may well receive only a number produced by the underlying
information.356 Thus, that user may not even be able to alert a consumer
Id.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532-37 (1995); see also Richard S. Murphy,
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381
(1996) (arguing that substantial economic benefits may derive from privacy rights).
354
Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2071 (2001).
355
One study of 197 identity theft victims revealed that the average time spent by victims
to clear their records was 330 hours and that many lost thousands of dollars in lost wages
and spent hundreds in out-of-pocket expenses. Identity Theft Resource Center, Identity
Theft: The Aftermath 2004 13 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/
aftermath2004.pdf. The victims surveyed reported significant emotional impact from the
crime that resembled symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id. at 20-21.
356
See supra text accompanying notes 114-54.
352
353
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as to the particular record attributed to the consumer that lowered the
number in a way that costs the plaintiff an opportunity for a loan or a
lower interest rate. The increased automation of credit checks has
masked the individual items.
In addition to benefiting individuals, a standard that imposed
liability for reckless mismatching of records would enhance the integrity
of the pool of aggregatable data as a whole. At present, we have a
system that not only fails to promote accurate matching, but may in fact
discourage those who create data from sufficiently fixing the identity of
the doer and assigning sufficient identity markers to the record to keep it
stuck to that individual, making sure it would not be prone to attaching
to the identity of another.
These practices could retard the
improvements that data matching technology offers to both those who
use data and those whose data is used.
C. The Feasibility of Meeting the Standard
The technology that could improve the accuracy and integrity of
personal information already exists. To maintain the shield of the
qualified privilege that defamation accords data aggregators, they
should be required to use that technology to verify that a negative record
does not bear identity markers that are insufficient to pin that item to a
particular consumer, or that the item’s identity markers do not differ in
meaningful ways from those of the target consumer. That businesses
and data aggregators are aware of the risks to consumers of mismatching
records and that they have the ability to match deeds more exactingly to
their doer’s identity is shown by the very products that they create and
market. They can require matching of more identity markers to avoid
the misattribution errors that arise from undermatching. For example,
Experian, on its home page, notifies readers of the risks of identity
theft.357 It advertises a product called “Credit Manager” that notifies a
consumer by email of “important changes” to a consumer’s report.358
Given that, as discussed above, the agencies do not keep individual files
on consumers, but rather gather information on the fly when requested
by sending the algorithm trolling through the databases, the product
indicates that they are able to seek new information automatically.359
Trans Union offers a credit monitoring service called True Credit that
also sends email notices of changes within 24 hours, and it offers identity
Experian Home Page, http://www.experian.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
Credit Manager Home Page, https://www.creditexpert.com/ (last visited Jan. 13,
2007).
359
See supra text accompanying notes 37-93.
357
358
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theft insurance and fraud resolution services as well.360 Equifax warns
consumers that it could take up to two years to clear your name if you’re
a victim of identity theft and offers a product called Credit Watch Gold
to help consumers prevent the agency from reporting a thief’s debts in
their names.361 The fear of being the target of misattributed information
has helped the data aggregator, Equifax, take in record revenue in
2004.362 Its personal solutions business, where it sells its identity theft
prevention products, rose dramatically as well.363
This sort of “supermatch,” if done routinely, could be used to weed
out information not meeting the supermatch standard, which would
help improve the accuracy of the snapshot of each consumer’s financial
image. Furthermore, credit scoring algorithms have already been
developed that purport to be able to verify identities by matching
identity markers.364 Such feasibility exists outside the traditional credit
reporting industry in the modern data aggregation market as well. One
of the leading data aggregators, ChoicePoint, even verifies the range of
the issue date for a given person’s social security number against the
associated date of birth.365
The products offered show that these data aggregators are highly
aware of the prevalence of identity theft and that they have the analytical
capacity to discern unusual activity in a particular consumer’s name, at
least if the consumer is willing to pay for it. Another product, offered by
Equifax, indicates that furnishers should be able to verify the identities of
those with whom they do business, which would help them reduce
mistranscription errors. Equifax offers businesses the automated ability
to “[q]uickly and easily authenticate identities online.”366

True Credit Home Page, http://www.truecredit.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
Equifax Personal Solutions Home Page, https://www.econsumer.equifax.co.uk/
consumer/uk/sitepage.ehtml?forward=gb_esn_detail (last visited Jan. 13, 2007); see also
Credit Watch Gold Home Page, https://www.econsumer.equifax.com/consumer/
sitepage.ehtml?forward=esn_detail. (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
362
Ann McDonald, Market Watch: Equifax’s Stock Soars (2006), http://www.credit
collectionsworld.com/cgi-bin/readstory2.pl?story=20050801CCRQ313.xml.
363
Id.
364
Ann McDonald, High Points for Credit Scoring, http://www.creditcollectionsworld.
com/cg-bin/readstring.pl?story=20050401CCR0247.xml (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). Each of
the big three credit reporting agencies, Trans Union, Experian, and Equifax, uses scoring
algorithms to prevent fraud, target collection efforts, and assess risk. Id.
365
CHOICEPOINT, PROCHECK: CHOICEPOINT AUTHENTICATION SOLUTIONS 2 (2005),
http://www.choicepoint.com/authentication/common/pdfs/ProCheck.pdf.
366
Equifax Business Solutions Home Page, www.equifax.com/biz/solutions/fraud.
shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
360
361

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 6

1140 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

V. CONCLUSION
Information about individual transactions that used to just simply
evaporate at the conclusion of the deal can now be recorded, searched,
analyzed, and passed around, easily accessible once networked into the
Internet. At the same time, we are often so detached from our
information that a cache of records in a database and not personal
knowledge determines whether any particular event is attributed to an
individual. Because of the volume of transactions and the need to
identify each transaction with a specific flesh-and-blood person, it has
become all too easy for a potentially crippling record about a transaction
to become ascribed to someone other than the original doer.
Once upon a time, the tort of defamation could provide redress for
someone falsely accused of being unworthy of credit, and that redress
likely curbed such accusers. Later, the FCRA largely supplanted the old
common law action, at least for those financial transactions that fell
within its scope.
However, those standards impose meaningful
requirements on data providers and data aggregators only after an item
has been wrongly ascribed to an innocent consumer. Furthermore, the
Act unreasonably protects data providers and aggregators through its
provisions that grant those parties qualified immunity from some torts,
provide unqualified immunity from private suit for many of its accuracy
standards, and preempt state accuracy standards. This protection is
unreasonable because a false attribution may well stick to the consumer
even after the consumer has used the Act’s provisions to accuse a
provider or aggregator of failing to ensure accuracy because digital data
is so easily duplicated and transmitted. Once accused, a consumer may
never fully restore the reputation arising from those records.
Accordingly, while the Act may have been appropriate for analog
records, which were burdensome to search and highly subject to human
error. Now, however, bad data has more power and information
technology allows those who traffic in data to use computers to analyze,
verify, and cross-check it. This mastery over data, in light of the power
of that data, justifies meaningful liability for mismatching denigrating
information to an individual when the data provider or aggregator could
have easily avoided the misattribution. By acknowledging the power
providers and aggregators have over the information, the providers’ and
aggregators’ culpability can rise to the level of recklessness necessary to
overcome the common law’s qualified privilege and the FCRA’s
qualified immunity from defamation. If the risk of liability for initial
reporting rises, data providers and aggregators could direct information
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technology to prevent the pollution of the data sea with mismatched
information from the start.
Preventing pollution by inaccurate data will help individuals
maintain the reputations that they have earned through their own deeds,
rather than the deeds of someone else. Their transactional biographies
will reflect their own choices and personalities as expressed through
those choices. By curbing the reckless use and abuse of information, the
common law of defamation can protect the rights of individuals to
personal dignity by treating them as individuals who make distinct
choices as opposed to objects who serve the purposes of others.
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